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The thesis discusses games and the gaming experience. It is divided into two main 
sections; the first examines games in general, while the second concentrates exclusively 
on electronic games. The text approaches games from two distinct directions by looking 
at both their spatiality and their narrativity at the same time. These two points of view are 
combined right from the beginning of the text as they are used in conceptualising the 
nature of the gaming experience.  
 
The purpose of the thesis is to investigate two closely related issues concerning both the 
field of game studies and the nature of games. In regard to studying games, the focus is 
placed on the juxtaposition of ludology and narratology, which acts as a framework for 
looking at gaming. In addition to aiming to find out whether or not it is possible to 
undermine the said state of affairs through the spatiality of games, the text looks at the 
interrelationships of games and their spaces as well as the role of narratives in those 
spaces.  
 
The thesis is characterised by discussing alternative points of view and its hypothetical 
nature. During the text, it becomes apparent that the relationship between games and 
narratives is strongly twofold: on one hand, the player continuously narrativizes the states 
the game is in while playing, while the narratives residing within the game space form 
their own partially separate narrative spaces, on the other. These spaces affect the 

















Taiteiden tutkimuksen laitos / Humanistinen tiedekunta 
 
LEHTO, ANTTONI: Mediating the Immediate – Endogenous meanings and simulated 
narratives in ludic spaces 





Tutkielma käsittelee pelejä ja pelikokemusta. Se on jaettu kahteen pääosioon, joista 
ensimmäisessä tutkitaan kaikenlaisia pelejä ja toisessa ainoastaan elektronisia pelejä. 
Teksti lähestyy kaikkia pelejä yhtä aikaa sekä tilallisuuden että kerronnallisuuden 
suunnista. Näkökulmat yhdistetään heti tutkielman alussa niiden toimiessa apuna 
pelikokemusta käsitteellistettäessä.  
 
Tutkielman tarkoitus on käsitellä kahta toisiinsa läheisesti liittyvää kysymystä, joista 
toinen kytkeytyy pelitutkimukseen ja toinen itse peleihin. Pelitutkimuksellisesti 
tutkimuksen keskiössä on ludologian ja narratologian välisen vastakkaisasettelun 
mielekkyys, joka toimii viitekehyksenä pelien luonteeseen pureutuvassa ongelmassa. Sen 
lisäksi, että tavoitteena on ottaa selville, onko edellä mainittua asetelmaa mahdollista 
purkaa pelien tilallisuuden kautta, tekstissä keskitytään myös pelien ja niiden luomien 
tilojen suhteisiin sekä narratiivien rooleihin kyseisissä tiloissa. 
 
Tutkimukselle ominaista on uusien näkökantojen kehitteleminen ja tietty hypoteettinen 
luonne. Tutkimuksen myötä käy selväksi, että pelien ja narratiivien suhde on vahvasti 
kaksitahoinen: toisaalta pelaaja kerronnallistaa pelitilanteita jatkuvasti pelikokemuksen 
aikana, kun taas toisaalta pelien sisältämät narratiivit luovat pelitilaan omia osittain 
pelitilasta irrallisia kerronnallisia tilojaan. Nämä tilat vaikuttavat osaltaan pelaajan 
käsitykseen pelitilanteista ja pelitilan sisältämistä tapahtumista. 
 
 



























All things move toward their end 
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1. Introduction 
 
This text discusses games in all shapes and sizes. Since it would be very unfruitful to 
examine games without looking at gaming as an activity as well, the player-subject’s 
experience is explored in parallel with its objects. As will become clear in the course of 
the study, the act of gaming cannot take place without a game it is in reference to and 
vice versa. This fact is essential to the whole thesis; both the activity and its object exist 
only in connection to each other. 
 
The text also discusses narratives and the relationship they have with games. The aim is 
not simply to state their equality to a certain degree and proceed from there, but to see 
how the different elements inherent to each of them mix with each other. This is achieved 
by examining concepts like space, sign and representation, all of which are fundamental 
to both. When examined in the light of recent developments in game studies, the 
approach can be viewed as a potentially explosive one; thus its justification is given a lot 
of attention in this introductory chapter. 
 
With these two huge and notably distinct areas of study appearing in a single body of 
work, the approach itself must naturally be dramatically narrowed down. Consequently, 
the thesis will not attempt to provide anything like a comprehensive history of gaming, a 
summary of any branch of narratology nor any other kind of overview of the subject 
matter under scrutiny. Although some theoretical critique is provided in places, the main 
focus of the thesis is in the search for possibilities rather than problems. This results in a 
study quite hypothetical and structurally unorthodox by nature. The method, together 
with the relevant issues following from its choice, is discussed toward the end of this 
chapter after first examining how the approach positions itself in relation to the two most 
commanding forces of game studies today, namely ludology and narratology. At this 
point, however, let us first briefly survey the field in general before moving on to the 
juxtaposition that has dominated it in recent years. 
 
 1
Games have come into the scope of cultural studies to stay. This has been a result of 
popularisation of electronic games, which have usually been seen as a continuation of the 
filmic tradition, the connection being their audiovisual form as entertainment and art. The 
relation electronic games have with other games has been perhaps given less attention, 
however, and undeservedly so. Without electronic games there would be little point in 
looking at games in general in media studies; on the other hand, without games in general 
there would not be electronic ones at all. 
 
Electronic games are getting closer to other cultural forms both technically and 
thematically.1 These progressions have been giving birth to the alleged illusion that 
electronic games are just another link in the chain of audiovisual art and nothing more. It 
seems sometimes not too difficult, while concentrating purely on their audiovisual 
aspects, to overlook the fact that there have been games practically since the beginning of 
time and there probably always will be. Electronic games are thus also a continuation of 
that tradition2 and ought to be looked at as such, not just as audiovisual representations. 
As will be argued on several occasions in the text, games are not artefacts or products at 
heart, even though the rise of electronic games may have indicated that. Some new 
pervasive forms of gaming3 have in fact moved the focus of playing back to less virtual 
environments. It is also intriguing to see the social aspects of gaming coming back to 
focus with, for instance, MMORPGs.4 Actually, one of the reasons electronic games have 
been regarded as something close to film is that one used to experience them mainly by 
oneself, especially in the case of PC-games.5 This thesis, however, will only concentrate 
on the social aspects of games on their basic structural level without touching upon the 
communal dimensions outside the scope of the immediate experience of gaming inherent 
in every gaming situation. 
 
                                                 
1 Huhtamo, Erkki & Kangas, Sonja (2000, 11). 
2 Julian Kücklich calls this tradition the “ludic context”. Kücklich (2002, 105). 
3 Also called location-based gaming, pervasive gaming, reality gaming. Eskelinen (2005, 76). 
4 MMORPG stands for Massive Multiplayer Online Role-Playing Game, e.g. Ultima Online, World of 
Warcraft and EverQuest. 
5 Eskelinen, Markku (2005, 76-7). 
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According to some calculations, the game industry is bigger than movie industry.6 As 
objects of academic study, though, games do not perhaps fare so well. The field is still 
quite young and fragmented, even the gaming experience itself having received relatively 
little attention thus far.7 As a result, there seems to exist relatively few influential theories 
that are generally agreed upon. This may also be because of the defensive attitude that is 
obvious in some texts by game scholars regardless of the obscurity of their opinions or 
points of view,8 the possible reasons for which will be discussed in the next section. Be 
that as it may, there is relatively little on the field of game studies that is written in stone 
and its discussions are constantly disrupted by linguistic inaccuracies and confusion in 
regard to terminology.9 This is reflected in the large amount of attention that will be paid 
to the terms used in the text in question. Some insights into the juxtaposition between 
ludology and narratology will be offered in the following before moving the limelight on 
the actual approach adopted in this thesis. 
 
 
1.1. Ludology | Narratology 
 
As suggested above, two rather distinct approaches have dominated the field of electronic 
game studies in recent years: the ludologist and the narratologist. The main source for the 
alleged controversy is the debate about whether games can be considered and studied as 
narratives.10 Even though there is no real reason to underline the seemingly obvious 
juxtaposition of these two schools of thought, its existence is extremely useful to note as 
it shows us where we should look for answers in regard to the nature of gaming: 
somewhere in between. 
 
Narratology concentrates on the study of narrative, which is certainly one of the most 
multidimensional concepts in cultural studies. The majority of its uses can usually co-
                                                 
6 See e.g. Aarseth, Espen (2001, 153) and Eskelinen, Markku (2005, 24). 
7 Järvinen, Aki (2008, 33). 
8 Which is always relative, of course. 
9 Sihvonen, Tanja (2004, 46), see e.g. Frasca, Gonzalo (2003a). 
10 Eskelinen, Markku (2005, 58). 
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exist peacefully as long as no attempt is made to define it or to outline its constitutive 
elements.11 However, it is not useful for our purposes to do either at this point of the 
thesis; thus at the moment, the main focus falls on ludology.12
 
The term ‘ludology’ comes from the Latin word ’ludus’, which translates roughly 
as ’game’. It was introduced to the masses by ludologist Gonzalo Frasca,13 who has 
fought hard for the academic credibility of game studies; in his quest, he has been joined 
by other renowned game scholars like Espen Aarseth, Markku Eskelinen and Jesper Juul, 
the goal of all of them being to stabilise ludology’s position as an independent branch of 
cultural studies. According to these scholars, the only way to reach this goal is to develop 
a wholly new theory base, with the help of which it is possible to transform game studies 
not just into a continuation of literature or film studies, but into its own respected field of 
scientific scholarship. This is admittedly a noble goal in itself, especially in the light of 
game history, which is not restricted to novels and movies, but in fact mainly includes 
other non-electronic games. 
 
The basic principle behind ludology is that games and gaming should be studied as, and 
only as, games and gaming. Therefore its most pertinent questions revolve around 
interfaces and the gaming situation. Ludologists often downplay (pardon the expression) 
the effects other mediums have on the origin, history and development of electronic 
games and the semiotic processes involved with them. Media scholar Janet H. Murray 
calls this attitude “game essentialism”,14 since it strives to ideologically exclude game 
studies from other fields of cultural study. Traditionally, ludologists have emphasised the 
experience and the narratologists the narratological elements of games. What is notable 
about the two approaches is that some of the studies concentrating purely on one or the 
other can be seen as having suffered from the situation, as there has long seemed to exist 
unstated pressure to take part in the debate by positioning oneself in it. Even though this 
                                                 
11 Ryan, Marie-Laure (2005, 34). 
12 Narratives will naturally be examined in detail later in the text (section ‘Narrative | Narrativity’). 
13 Frasca, Gonzalo (1999). 
14 Murray, Janet H. (2005). 
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has not often resulted in one-dimensional or obstinate opinions per se, it has nevertheless 
been a definite factor eliciting such readings. 
 
One of the problems extreme ludologists face is that a large number of game scholars 
have started their academic careers as narratologists and have only later turned to games, 
maybe even becoming narrativists, who look at interactive narratives while still holding 
an “anti-game” position.15 According to some ludologists, this has had an imperialistic 
effect on game studies. Partly because of this some representatives of game essentialism, 
headed by the likes of Eskelinen and Aarseth, have been forced to tighten their 
territoriality, which has as its worst resulted in downright contempt for narratology and 
its exemplars.16 The allegation of narratologists’ scientific imperialism can be seen as a 
typical instance of this behaviour as well.17 On the other hand, there have also been 
accusations for ludologists’ arguments being “ideologically motivated rather than 
theoretically grounded”.18 Be that as it may, the scholarly climate where an already 
powerful theoretical approach encloses new research subjects within its area of influence 
is similar to the events of 1950s, when the auteur-theory saw the light of day. Auteurism 
can after all be seen as an attempt to increase the credibility of film studies during that 
period in time; the outcomes of the context at hand today remain to be seen. 
 
As stated, new mediums (or people studying new mediums to be precise) are often for a 
lookout for justification for their presence by consciously emphasising the special 
features that separate their own are of interest from others. This happened with the 
auteur-theory in the context of film and it has been happening amongst ludologists as 
well.19 If one cannot detect similarities between certain objects of inquiry, it is naturally 
quite difficult to contemplate possible connections between the theoretical approaches 
they might warrant. For Aarseth, games represent a new form of aesthetics, which is an 
opposite paradigm to narrative.20 For our purposes, this black-and-white distinction is 
                                                 
15 Mateas, Michael (2002, 34). 
16 See e.g. Eskelinen, Markku (2005, 58) on Marie-Laure Ryan. 
17 See e.g. Aarseth, Espen (2004a, 45). 
18 Simons, Jan (2006). 
19 For an early example, see Aarseth, Espen (1997, 1-23). 
20 Aarseth, Espen (2001, 154). 
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overly harsh, since it is not too difficult to find narrational elements in games; actually, 
games can easily (it must be admitted, maybe a little too easily) be seen as a form of 
storytelling. 
 
Unfortunately, Aarseth’s arguments suffer from a quite narrow-minded outlook on the 
intertextuality between games and other media. The issue is relevant for this thesis in the 
sense that as the scope of intertextuality extends to games, it serves as a rather plausible 
proof of the fact that games can and should be studied also with methods that are not 
included in the theoretical toolbox of extreme ludology. Aarseth argues that   
 
games are not intertextual [but] self-contained. You don’t need to have played 
poker or ludo to understand chess, and knowledge of roulette will not help you to 
understand Russian roulette. [...] Knowing Star Wars: The Phantom Menace will 
not make you better at playing Pod Racer. Unlike in music, where a national 
anthem played on electric guitar takes on a whole new meaning, the value system 
of a game is strictly internal, determined unambivalently by the rules.21
 
In effect, Aarseth basically claims that catching the ball with a glove in Baseball22 has no 
relation to the same act in Finnish Baseball.23 It is very hard to believe that spinning the 
cylinder in Russian Roulette and in normal Roulette are in a similar non-existent 
relationship with each other. Furthermore, being familiar with Episode I undoubtedly 
makes one better in Pod Racer: after all, the racetrack from the film is directly transferred 
to the game and prior knowledge of its twists and turns helps in playing the game. 
Consequently, Aarseth’s claim acts as a perfect example of territorial argumentation, 






                                                 
21 Aarseth, Espen (2004a, 48). The example concerning Pod Racer originally from Juul, Jesper (2001). 
22 I use capital letters and italics to emphasise the gameness of Baseball as opposed to a kind of sport or 
other such activity, just like with e.g. Poker and Football later in the text. 
23 ’Pesäpallo’ in Finnish. 
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1.2. Orientation | Foci 
 
As evident from the discussion above, extreme ludology cannot be considered as the only 
fruitful starting point for a game study. It is more useful for this thesis to regard narrative 
and gameness as parallel phenomena, in other words as “parallel operational logics of the 
digital culture”.24 The transparency of partly equating electronic games with narrative 
media forms apparent in the text is thus a conscious choice, since little is to be gained by 
stressing the juxtaposition between ludology and narratology. On the other hand, 
emphasising only one aspect of a given object under scrutiny is also a certain way to 
hinder theoretical developments, as can be seen in the case of film and film sound, where 
the aural constantly plays the second fiddle to the visual.25
 
To put it in blunt terms, games do not represent an opposite paradigm to narrative. 
Although narratives do not usually include explicit gaming elements, games do often 
contain obvious narrative elements. The similarity of games and narratives lies in the fact 
that they are both interpreted in a certain context and in a somehow demarcated space. 
For games, that element is perhaps even more typical, as narratives are usually more 
freely interpreted by their nature with their emphasised extradiegetic aspects. Games are 
self-contained by nature as stated by Aarseth in the discussion above, but not absolutely 
so. 
 
To avoid similar one-sided arguments, it is profitable to consciously seek the middle 
ground between the two main approaches in game studies. To do that, we must be able to 
see games not as an opposite paradigm to narratives, but as a certain kind of perspective 
to an activity26 with immersive27 qualities resulting in an experience unbound by medium 
or narrative theories. At the centre of all this, there is a struggle for methodological 
                                                 
24 Sihvonen, Tanja (2004, 47), my translation from Finnish: “rinnakkain olemassa oleviksi digitaalisen 
kulttuurin toimintalogiikoiksi”. 
25 Lehto, Anttoni (2006). 
26 Huizinga, Johan (1970, 22). 
27 Murray, Janet H. (1997, 97). 
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monism that will hopefully combine the best ideas from many different schools of 
thought. 
 
In regard to games, the most essential aspect is the gaming experience, which has always 
been emphasised by ludologists.28 However, the nature of the ludic experience is still 
quite close to those semiotic processes that are within narratology’s grasp. In addition to 
the obvious narrative elements found in some games, the player-subject must always be 
able to narrativize endless numbers of game states to triumph in any game. Additionally, 
the freedom of choice allegedly arising from the interactivity of a game is often really 
only illusory, as the possible interpretations of a given situation are always limited by the 
rules, goals and interface of the game, all of which are in some form authorial by nature, 
especially with electronic games. These restrictions meet the player-subject in ludic 
space.29
 
In reference to the full title of this study, it is perhaps in order to already at this point 
clarify two other concepts that will be taken up only later in the text, in other words those 
of ‘endogenous’ and ‘simulated’. Both terms are essential in sketching out the inner 
semiotic relationships of any given game space. Something endogenous always refers to 
what lies within the said space, while simulations function as the mode through which the 
endogenous ludic matter is represented.30 As mentioned, both concepts are applicable to 
all kinds of games. 
 
In relation to electronic games in specific, the focus of the thesis can be illustrated using 
the bottom-up approach suggested by game scholar Lars Konzack, which lists different 
layers of game elements of which an electronic game is formed. The seven layers are 
‘hardware’, ‘program code’, ‘functionality’, 'gameplay’, ‘meaning’, ‘referentiality’ and 
‘socio-culture’.31 This text focuses on the middle ones, ‘gameplay’ and ‘meaning’. To put 
                                                 
28 See e.g. Juul, Jesper (2001) & Whalen, Zach (2003). 
29 ‘Ludic space’ and ‘game space’ are treated as synonyms in this text. In fact, the word ‘ludic’ often occurs 
in the text to replace the word ‘game’ in compounds like ‘game/ludic context’ or ‘game/ludic 
environment’. They are thus practically synonymous in the context of this thesis. 
30 Both terms will be further explored in much more detail in the third chapter of the thesis. 
31 Konzack, Lars (2002, 89-98). 
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it in different terms, the thesis follows Julian Kücklich’s trail of thought in that while 
acknowledging his two-level model for electronic games as texts, namely the separation 
of the ‘code’ and the ‘interface’, 32 it will concentrate almost exclusively on the latter.  
 
In addition to electronic games, the text will discuss all kinds of games, privileging the 
position of electronic games principally as a type of game. The approach has some 
interesting implications in reference to media and the definition of art. However, it 
suffices here to point out that because of the definition of ‘game space’ and its centrality 
to the thesis, it is essential for the thesis to form theoretical connections not only with 
non-electronic games but with other audiovisual forms of art as well. This is likely to blur 
the lines of both art and media much like the rise of pop culture or environmental art in 
their respective times. Games can easily be considered as art and/or a medium or 
alternatively, neither. Questioning whether, for instance, World of Warcraft (the online 
game) is closer to The Lord of the Rings (the film trilogy) or Monopoly (the board game) 
as a frame of reference, experience or narrative is a fascinating, relevant issue. As 
previously stated, this thesis seeks to probe the problem at hand specifically through the 
concept of ‘space’. 
 
The thesis has two parallel foci that connect the nature of game to the nature of game 
studies: 
 
1) What is the nature of the relationship between the game and its space? 
2) How can the role of narrative be located in relation to the game space? 
 
Discussing these two questions, in addition to other relevant issues, will hopefully result 
in an alternative understanding of how the relation between game and narrative can be 
reconciled in the field of game studies. The idea is to find a route through the jungle of 
game studies in a negotiating way; to do that, one must start from the beginning and 
define the object of inquiry. 
 
                                                 
32 Kücklich, Julian (2002, 101-2). 
 9
Ludwig Wittgenstein describes games as a group as having ”family resemblances”,33 but 
being indefinable because of having nothing in common with each other.34 However, this 
text aims to disprove the statement to as large a degree as possible. In the thesis, all 
games, regardless of whether they are electronic or not, are considered vehicles for 
gaming experience. This is achieved by focusing on the point of perception of the player-
subject, not on why one plays, but on what happens while playing a game; the point of 
view is phenomenological in that it examines “how something is manifested”.35 In the 
ludic context, the approach is thus necessarily concentrated on whoever is engaged with 
the act of gaming, since there does not even have to be an audience present.36 
Furthermore, the player-subject and the possible audience experience the game in 
completely different terms in the first place. 
 
The thesis gets off the ground via the basic presupposition that playing games can be 
considered to be a form of semiosis just like, for instance, reading a novel.37 This point of 
view will lead to a multidimensional treatment of narrative, since the special nature of 
gaming calls for examining multiple modes of signification. In other words, in relation to 
the player-subject, narrative is a “transcendent sort of medium”,38 which can be applied 
on multiple levels. As it will become obvious later, this is also one of the reasons why 
gaming must be looked at generally before focusing on electronic games in specific. 
 
On a basic level, “[n]arrative is a way of comprehending space, time, and causality.”39 
Inherent to narrative is also “a certain progression from an initial to a final state.”40 If a 
game’s progression is divided into segments and those segments are looked at as 
narrative elements, narrative emerges as a factor guiding the interpretation of the game. 
When we think of how games could be narrativized, we naturally have to look at the 
                                                 
33 Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1968, 32), ”Familienähnlichkeiten”, translation from German by G.E.M. 
Anscombe. 
34 Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1968, 31-2). 
35 Raatikainen, Panu (2004, 100), my translation from Finnish: ”miten asiat ilmenevät”. 
36 Eskelinen, Markku (2005, 64). 
37 Kücklich, Julian (2001). 
38 Branigan, Edward (1992, 121). 
39 Branigan, Edward (1992, 36), italics removed. 
40 Branigan, Edward (1984, 175). 
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experience of gaming. Thus, if we assert that gaming is based on the gaming experience, 
examining games as having narrative qualities does not mean sacrificing games on 
narratology’s altar. In other words, we agree with the following ludological statement: 
 
Narratives may be fundamental to human thought, but this does not mean that 
everything should be described in narrative terms. And that something can be 
presented in narrative form does not mean that it is narrative.41
 
Games are not narratives, but keeping in mind certain ludological principles makes it 
possible to discuss games in relation to narratives. The text will first examine all games 
with or without explicit narrative elements at same time, then turning the whole approach 
upside down by examining games in general as something that must be narrativized; the 
overtly generic nature of this method will hopefully be overshadowed by the discoveries 
that are made about the nature of the relationship between games and narratives. At no 
point, however, can it be forgotten that gaming is the more fundamental phenomenon in 
relation to narrative. Thus in this thesis, “we shall try to take play as the player himself 














                                                 
41 Juul, Jesper (2001). 
42 Huizinga, Johan (1970, 22). 
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2. Nature of Game – From Playing to Narrativity 
 
Play is older than culture, for culture, however inadequately defined, always 
presupposes human society, and animals have not waited for man to teach them 
their playing. We can safely assert, even, that human civilization has added no 
essential feature to the general idea of play.43
 
Thus begins the first chapter of Johan Huizinga’s Homo Ludens, originally published in 
1938,44 one of the earliest and most influential works on play to date. As touched upon in 
the introduction, the origins of play go back to prehistory. While the same is true for 
narratives, Aarseth claims that play has an older tradition than telling stories and thus 
their cultural value is close to equal even though narrative has been the more powerful a 
paradigm for centuries.45 However, the question whether the prehistoric man first 
represented past events with gestures or played with stones is irrelevant; here, Huizinga 
points to the fact that the idea of play is an extremely natural and encompassing one. The 
present chapter is dedicated to all kinds of games. 
 
In the context of outlining playing games in particular, which can be (and in this thesis is) 
seen as a subcategory of all play,46 certain formality is needed. Pinpointing that formality 
is the aim of this chapter. The chapter does not, however, aim to offer a comprehensive 
account of the theoretical framework of the whole thesis, as some elements of gaming 
will be taken up especially in connection to electronic games during the second part of 
the text. We begin looking at games in general by making the all-important distinction 
between playing and gaming. The arguments running through the text are constructed via 





                                                 
43 Huizinga, Johan (1970, 19). 
44 Encyclopædia Britannica: www.britannica.com/eb/article-9041447 
45 Aarseth, Espen (2004a, 46). 
46 Salen, Katie & Zimmerman, Eric (2004, 72). 
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2.1 Playing – Gameness 
 
Playing | Gaming 
 
As previously stated, the present chapter and thus the whole first half of the thesis is 
devoted to playing games in general. Electronic games will not be specifically touched 
upon yet as the text will mainly stay on a broader level. To get to the heart of gaming, it 
is of utmost importance that the term ‘game’ is defined as precisely as possible. This also 
includes making a distinction between playing and gaming. 
 
Play is manifested in many different ways. One can play instruments, characters, roles, 
tricks or games, to name but a few. Distinguishing between these modes of play is 
usually relatively effortless. Even in the case of Guitar Hero, in which one plays an 
instrument (a toy guitar), a role (a rock star) and a game all at once, it is quite clear, for 
reasons later discussed, that the gaming, and thus the gameness, of Guitar Hero presents 
itself as the dominant mode of activity. The act comes close to playing an actual guitar, 
but not differently from the way playing Gran Turismo with a wheel and pedals comes 
close to driving an actual car or Duck Hunt actually hunting. ‘Definite’ problems do not 
arise until we look at pure ‘play’, as an intransitive verb in linguistic terms. 
 
To put the argument differently, ‘games’ are something one ‘plays’, although ‘to play’ 
does not always mean ‘to play games’ in the sense of referring to the alleged medium. 
‘Games’ themselves come in two major groups closely intertwined with each other: the 
games that are the result of playing47 and the games that are the result of gaming.48 The 
distinction is a fickle one at best and in many cases outsiders (the so-called audience) or 
even the subjects taking part in the activity cannot observe the difference. Let us take an 
example, in which three children play store on the edge of a forest. They use pine cones 
for money, two of them making trips to the woods to find things the self-appointed 
storekeeper might find interesting enough to buy. For some time, cones are traded for 
                                                 
47 ’Leikki’ in Finnish. 
48 ’Peli’ in Finnish. 
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beautiful rocks, feathers and the like. At some point, one of the customers begins to pay 
closer attention to the amounts of pine cones changing hands. He decides that he wants to 
have more than his friend by the time his mother picks him up in half an hour. Running 
around the forest looking for rabbit’s feet and bear skulls he makes a ‘virtual’ 
commitment to try to have as many pine cones as possible. By this time the act of playing 
had slipped into the realm of gaming, phased in by the desire for a ludic experience. 
 
Umberto Eco distinguishes “using” a text from “interpreting” a text, even though 
“[e]very empirical reading is always an unpredictable mixture of both.”49 Using and 
interpreting a given text are “abstract theoretical possibilities”,50 in other words different 
perspectives on the same thing. Similarly in connection to games, playing and gaming are 
largely different perspectives on the same thing; the choice is often for the subject to 
make. What is more, both playing and gaming are typically present in any process of 
playful activity, fading in and out in the subject’s experience of that activity. This can be 
seen, for example, in the gimmickry of an overconfident defenseman, who does not 
simply get rid of the puck even though heavily pressured by two opponents near his 
team’s own goal during the last seconds of a tight NHL-match. 51
 
Slipping between these two realms is well depicted by an analogy borrowed from Murray, 
who uses water as a metaphor for immersion.52 For our purposes, water is gameness and 
swimming stands for all play. Moving in the water is typically done by swimming, but 
the potential for a different perspective is omnipresent. To dive once in a while is a 
refreshing and usually voluntary experience, which is completely different from one 
above the water; below, different rules apply. The fickle nature of gaming is underlined 
by the fact that it is also possible to just push your face underwater and otherwise stay 
afloat. On the other hand, when equipped with the right gear, one can stay under for long 
periods at a time, always resurfacing at a slightly different location, ready to go on 
                                                 
49 Eco, Umberto (1990, 62). 
50 Ibid. 
51 NHL stands for National Hockey League. 
52 Murray, Janet H. (1997, 98). 
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swimming. Gaming is, in its broadest sense, a point of view, which is pleasurable because 
of its comprehensiveness. 
 
Before attempting to map different characteristics of games, however, an essential 
practical aspect must be stressed. When the term ‘play’ is used in this text from this 
onward, it is only used in connection to ‘games’ unless otherwise indicated. The same 
applies also to the term ‘game’ itself, which always refers to ‘a game that are the result of 
gaming’ from this point onward. As already mentioned, the approach this thesis takes 
requires as clear-cut definitions of ‘game’ and ‘gaming’ as possible; thus a lot of effort is 
put into sketching both concepts. Please also note that everything expressed in the first 
half of the text in relation to games and gaming in general is also meant to cohere fully 
with the more specified discussion on electronic games in the second part of the thesis. 
 
 
Rules | Goals 
 
Children play silly games; I am speaking from personal experience. As a youngster, I 
used to ask people to pick a number, any number. After getting an answer, for example: 
‘Thirty-four’, I would immediately shout out: ‘Thirty-five! I just barely won!’ The so-
called catch was that the addressed person probably thought he was going to be shown a 
magic trick or proven some kind of a mathematical formula and therefore was completely 
oblivious of the fact that I was playing a game with him. 
 
Many would undoubtedly remark that the activity the anecdote describes is more closely 
affiliated with rolling in a mud pond in a relatively cool environment than playing Doom 
or even Trouble,53 but it is the aim of the thesis to show that this is not the case. Games 
have been defined in many different ways over their history and the definitions have been 
quite different from each other both in their approach and in their emphases. Here, four 
                                                 
53 The Finnish version of Trouble is called Kimble. 
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more useful and recent definitions have been chosen,54 two from game designers and two 
from game scholars. The designers’ definitions are discussed before those of the scholars’, 
first by going through the potential problems in all of them and then turning to their 
helpful aspects. Finally, a brand new definition of games and gaming will be offered. 
 
For game designer Greg Costikyan, a game is “an interactive structure of endogenous 
meaning that requires players to struggle toward a goal.”55 The dilemma of interactivity 
is returned to later on in the chapter; at this point, it suffices to say that it is the only 
problematic element here. The definition is simple and includes the idea of goal-oriented 
play, which is a common factor in all games, in one form or another. 
 
The Finnish game designer Ville Vuorela defines playing games as “an activity which is, 
from the player’s point of view, unproductive and recreational by nature and has an initial 
state, rules and a goal.”56 This definition is clearly not meant to be academic, but it does 
not make it any less useful for our purposes. However, Vuorela sees playing games as 
being “unproductive” and “recreational”, which is highly suspect: Poker is a game almost 
by any standards and it can sometimes be extremely productive and to some, clearly more 
than a hobby. Vuorela does add to Costikyan’s commentary by mentioning “an initial 
state” and “rules”, which, again, are both common factors in all games and to which we 
come back later. 
 
Game scholar James Newman offers the following definition, which is quite close to that 
of Vuorela: “[t]he game is a voluntary activity, engagement with which represents an end 
in itself rather than operating as a means to an end; game play is its own reward and is 
clearly distinguished from ordinary life.”57 “Voluntary” is admittedly a step up from 
“unproductive and recreational”, but the real downside of this definition is that games can 
be (and actually often are) means to an end: again, Poker can be used as a way to make a 
                                                 
54 All of the definitions attempt to outline games in general, but are still recent enough for the existence of 
electronic ones to be included. I will, however, refer to other definitions later in the text as well. 
55 Costikyan, Greg (2002, 24). 
56 Vuorela, Ville (2007, 16), my translation from Finnish: “Pelaaminen on pelaajan näkökulmasta 
ajanvietteeksi tarkoitettua tuottamatonta toimintaa, jolla on alkutilanne, säännöt ja päämäärä.” 
57 Newman, James (2005, 18). 
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living. Newman does also bring forward an important additional point, which is the 
natural separation of games from “ordinary life”; Newman’s choice of words only makes 
sense, if they are taken to mean ‘the real world’ as opposed to something ‘virtual’. 
 
Finally, for Espen Aarseth any game consists of “(1) rules, (2) a material/semiotic system 
(a gameworld), and (3) gameplay (the events resulting from application of the rules to the 
gameworld).”58 Two extremely interesting things can be noticed here. The first is the 
combination of the material and the semiotic, which together constitute “a gameworld”; 
the second in the supposed event structure that results from “gameplay”. 
 
To summarise and to follow the lead of these four game designers and scholars, the most 
salient aspects of gaming seem to condense into the following statement: playing games 
is an activity bound by rules and goals, somehow separated from the non-game and 
thus creating a limited space for gaming, which in turn results in a chain of events 
within that space, starting with a certain initial state. Note that in the four definitions 
above, little attention is given to the actual experience of play or narrativizing the game, 
which are after all supposed to be the cornerstones of ludologist and narratologist 
thinking, respectively. This seems to indicate that there might exist some incongruity 
between the way games are treated as cultural artefacts and the way they are studied in 
academic contexts. 
 
As mentioned earlier, the purpose of the anecdote about winning narrowly is to bring 
forward aspects of games that are important for determining what gaming is all about. 
The laughable simplicity and in-built unfairness of the game in question aside,59 the story 
illustrates in an illuminating way the nature of gaming from two distinct perspectives: 
first, the player’s experience of gaming and second, the non-player’s experience of non-
gaming. 
 
                                                 
58 Aarseth, Espen (2004a, 47-8). 
59 I will return to the question of ‘agreement’ later in the thesis. 
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As a player, I was familiar with the rules of the game: all players pick a number and the 
highest one wins. The goal of the game (defined by the rules) was thus to pick the 
highest number. I began playing by asking for my opponent for his choice. The act of 
asking was the first event in the game, breaking its initial state. After getting an answer, 
I ‘read’ the state of the game in that particular situation in such a way that I was able to 
pick a higher number than my opponent. In other words, the linkage between the rules 
and the players formed different kinds of game states60 within a certain game space.61 I 
was always aware of the fact that I was playing a game and that I was a part of its ludic 
space, which in turn directed my interpretation of both the game space and its different 
game states. Above, I have narrativized the events of the game, thus creating a narrative, 
but it is no longer directly connected with the ludic space itself; these ‘re-narrated’ events 
create their own, this time narrative, space. 
 
On the other hand, my green opponent in the story was not at any point aware that he was 
playing this (in any case) really unfair game. He did not know its rules or its goals, nor 
did he know he was a part of a game space, although for me he was. Only after I had 
informed him of his defeat he was able to see the irony (created by the artificial closeness 
of the result) in the sequence of events, which he was able to narrativize after the game 
was over. In his experience, no ludic space was ever formed. I played a game, because I 
experienced doing so; my opponent’s case was just the opposite. 
 
To provide another brief summary, rules, goals and the acts of player-subjects constitute 
game spaces and game states, which in turn can form narratives. Admittedly, the space 
itself is not too explicit in the example. On the other hand, it seldom is: being extremely 
slippery and hard to pin down is a characteristic quality for a ludic space, since it can be 
formed by a single decision.62 Space has a central part to play in any gaming experience, 
its role still being mainly unifying by nature. Now that we have mapped the most basic 
                                                 
60  ‘The state in which the game is within a certain space’. ‘Pelitilanne’ (from Finnish) is tricky term to 
translate, especially when Eskelinen uses the term ‘gaming situation’ for the experience of play, not for 
something within the ludic space as such. See Eskelinen (2001). 
61 ‘Pelitila’ in Finnish. 
62 Salen, Katie & Zimmerman, Eric (2004, 95) 
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Games | Non-Games 
 
Perhaps the most basic level that games can be thought of is as a sign cluster, which 
comprises of signs that can somehow be influenced by the player-subject. A definition so 
cursory is by itself practically useless, but for its own part important in discussing games 
in general. It can even be seen as being surprisingly close to the ultimate definition 
emerging from the following discussion. 
 
What constitutes a game then, if it is not just a sign cluster waiting to be semiotically 
poked? The answer is hardly simple. Many applications of the computer age have 
obscured the boundaries between games and non-games; these include, for instance, 
Second Life and countless machinima projects, in practice starting with Quake back in 
1996.63 This is one of the reasons games need to be redefined in a way that underlines the 
act of playing itself, not necessarily based on their content or them being real-world 
objects of some kind. 64 The game space with its rules and especially the goals of the 
player-subject acting in that space emerge as the most crucial elements of gameness, 
since target-orientation is always a part of any game; something is not a game, if it does 
not have goals determined by its rules,65 and a subject is not gaming, if she is not trying 
to reach those goals. The more complex the game, the more it can be seen having 
different goals. The goals can also be explicit or implicit by nature, but they still all 
originate from the rules. Naturally, there are always those who seek to undermine the 
author(ity) and just play along to sabotage others’ experience, as sometimes is the case in 
MMORPGs;66 in any case, sabotage is a good example of the fact that even within the 
                                                 
63 Bonza: bonza.rmit.edu.au/essays/2006/Charlie%20Drying/machinim.html 
64 The other being the role of electronic games as a new kind of game and not a completely new medium, as 
discussed before. 
65 See e.g. Järvinen, Aki (2008, 34). 
66 Eskelinen, Markku (2005, 77). 
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same ludic space all player-subjects do not have to have exactly the same set of goals. 
The ways the game allows to act accordingly, so to speak, can be collectively called the 
interface, which is typically associated only with computers and will be discussed 
primarily in connection to electronic games in this text. It is, however, an extremely 
helpful concept in regard to all games. 
 
To rephrase the previous argument, it can be asserted that ‘playing a game’ requires a 
“lusory attitude”67 just like ‘eating food’ requires a determination to swallow. Stuffing 
food in your mouth without swallowing does not qualify as eating, nor does stuffing food 
in through your nose. Admittedly, this is in part just a question of semantics, but it is also 
a question of understanding the ludic space that is created in relation to the player-subject. 
The semantic aspect can be partly sidestepped by adopting the term “ludic motivation”, 
which refers to “an interest in the skills, rules, competition and dynamic engagement 
invited by the game.”68 Playing a game is fundamentally about trying69 to reach goals 
that are primarily virtual by nature. 
 
In other words, to play a game, the player-subject must have goals that principally have 
to do with the game space in question; ludic motivation must be aimed at the virtual. 
Winning at Poker undeniably makes one rich in the real world, but before that one must 
excel in the game itself. Hence, for instance, Second Life is a game only as long as the 
player-subject experiences the virtual world and the goals within it as just that, virtual. If 
and when the player-subject channels his efforts to succeed in the real world, the ludic 
aspect and space of Second Life evaporates, transforming the environment into an 
application not much unlike eBay or a flea market. Games are used to train, to educate, to 
make money and so on, but the real question is not whether an army training simulation 
is a game or not, or even whether its ultimate goal is to produce better soldiers or not, but 
whether or not the subject experiences the simulation foremost as a game and thus its 
goals as virtual. In effect, gaming generally embraces more explicit goals, despite their 
                                                 
67 Salen, Katie & Zimmerman, Eric (2004, 97). 
68 Carr, Diane et al. (2003, 151), as opposed to “representational motivation” (to which I will come back 
later) and “communal motivation” (which is outside the scope of this thesis). 
69 The purpose here is to underline the principle, not offer clear-cut definition of ‘trying’. 
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virtuality, than real life.70 This is exactly the case with the number of points gained in an 
army simulator (explicit, virtual goal) as opposed to becoming a more proficient in 
warfare (implicit, real-world goal). Like with Poker, the idea of playing a training 
simulator is not at odds with possible benefits in the real world achieved by the act of 
gaming. Thus the experience of in-game goals is an essential factor in transforming a 
space into a game space, because they also turn any game space into a more or less 
virtual space.71
 
Another apt example on the differences between games and non-games can be found 
outside computers. Some time ago in Finland, a couple of stories with six alternate 
endings were published in Aku Ankan taskukirja.72 The ultimate ending was determined 
by the choices the subject was allowed to make at regular intervals over the course of the 
story; the subject was then clearly a factor in the formation of the narrative. These 
adventures were not games, however, because the structure did not impose a goal to be 
achieved: there was no specific ending to be attained. If the subject had been given a goal 
to reach at the beginning of the story, she would have read the narrative as a target-
oriented gaming experience and thus experienced it as a game. 
 
The above example sheds some light on the real focus of this thesis, as it brings forth how 
rules and goals have an effect on the manifestation of narrative potential within a certain 
ludic space. These issues will be dealt with in more detail toward the end of the chapter. 
However, let us now take one final instance of a kind of goal-oriented play that might be 
considered by many to be a borderline case: the notorious MacGyver the Drinking 
Game.73 Typically, any drinking game is used to get as many people as possible as drunk 
as possible in the shortest amount of time possible, but the player-subjects themselves 
often just try to get drunk enough to have a good time during and after the game. This 
does not create a paradox in the game space in itself, because the rules do not impose a 
                                                 
70 Järvinen, Aki (2008, 34). 
71 This aspect of game space will be further looked at later in the thesis (section ‘Virtuality | Space’). 
72 Donald Duck's Pocket Book. The stories were called ’Vanhan linnan salaisuus’ (’Topolino e il segreto 
del Castello’, Aku Ankan taskukirja 117 / 1989) and ’Keltaisen ruukun arvoitus’ (’Zio Paperone e l'anfora 
enigmatica’, Aku Ankan taskukirja 128 / 1990). Perunamaa: www.perunamaa.net/taskarit/ 
73 Source for rules: www.voimahali.fi/vh/showthread.php?t=50507 
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goal “get drunk”, but “drink when this or that happens”. The situation is partly similar to 
that with Poker and earning money by playing: a game can be a means to an end. 
 
However, the problem with MacGyver the Drinking Game is that the rules are practically 
impossible to follow to the letter because in that case every player-subject would be 
drinking practically all the time while watching an episode. The impossibility of the rules 
thus results in player-subjects drinking as much as they see fit to reach their individual 
goals, not as much as is required by the rules. Consequently, MacGyver the Drinking 
Game is right on the borderline between playing a game and just plain playing, although 
even typical gaming does often allow multiple goals depending on the complexity of the 
game space, some of the goals being more explicit than others. For instance, the goals 
determined by the rules of Tetris are much more explicit than those in the case of SimCity, 
which allows a goal like ‘building a city as close to real-world Tokyo as possible’ 
without compromising its status as a game: even this goal is within the scope of the 
game’s rules.74 Juul describes SimCity as a borderline case because of its open-
endedness,75 but that can be considered to be a highly questionable view as many games, 
for instance MMORPGs, do not offer definite closure and they can thus be seen as 
extending ad infinitum.76 Be that as it may, let us now take a fresh new look at defining 
‘game’ in regard to the above discussion on non-gameness. 
 
 
Formality | Gameness 
 
Here the four previously examined definitions are combined with a few additions on the 
basis of the discussion that followed. To summarise, meanings produced by games 
always remain at least partly separate from a non-ludic space. To achieve that, a game 
has to have a degree of formality, which is a result of rules in a limited space. The goals 
                                                 
74 Frasca, Gonzalo (2003b, 231). 
75 Juul, Jesper (2003, 31). 
76 In the light of this element, it is no wonder MMORPGs have been compared to soap operas. 
 22
and “subgoals”77 the player-subject tries to reach do not have to explicit, but if she does 
not struggle to achieve the in-game goals, she is not ‘playing a game’ or ‘gaming’, but 
just ‘using / experiencing an object’. The complexity of the game does not matter in itself: 
Civilization 4 and Paper/rock/scissors are both games as much as the other. Both of them 
have their own game rules and goals, which combined with the acts of the player-
subject(s), constitute a ludic space. 
 
As it has hopefully become very clear, games should not be primarily considered to be 
traditional narratives. However, games do become multi-sensory (sight, hearing, smell, 
touch and even taste in rarer occasions) narratives when you experience an act of playing 
by someone else. Regardless of the amount of in-game narrative content available for the 
player-subject, there are some elements that always apply when studying the 
multidimensionality of games and the experience of play. These principles form the core 
of gameness and gaming. 
 
1) to play a game is to experience doing so (at least at its initial state)78
2) games consist of rules, which separate it spatially from other non-game spaces 
3) the interface of the game and all its goals are also demarcated by its rules 
4) player-subjects must have ludic motivation to reach goals within game space 
5) player-subjects’ acts and their relation to rules form game states within game space 
6) the initial state of the game is the starting point for subsequent events and states 
7) events produced in game space can be narrativized to form a distinct narrative space 
 
The definition above does not mention electronic games for a good reason; what is 
ultimately more interesting than the shared elements of all electronic games is the 
connection between electronic games and all other games, not in the least because 
electronic games are “embedded in a deep and long tradition of play, and they borrow 
                                                 
77 Järvinen, Aki (2008, 34). E.g. in Football, scoring can be seen as a subgoal of winning the match, 
passing the ball successfully as a subgoal of scoring, etc. 
78 This thesis acknowledges the existence of Mihály Csíkszentmihályi’s term ‘flow’, but does not have the 
space to discuss it thoroughly. 
 23
formally from many other games.”79 Game scholar Stephen Poole calls this phenomenon 
“the technological prostheticization of play in general.”80 Typically when the spotlight is 
on electronic games, discussion usually turns either to whether they are narratives and 
which methods, from for instance film studies, one could possibly adopt (the narratologist 
view) or whether one should come up with new theories about them (the ludologist view). 
However, it is quite safe to say that what is important about games is playing them. Thus 
it should not be considered far-fetched to point out that what is important about studying 
games is studying the experience of play. Playing Chess in electronic format is, as an 
experience, after all, clearly more affiliated with playing Chess on a traditional 
chessboard than watching someone else play Chess, not to mention watching a movie 
about playing Chess.  
 
Consequently, gameness does not manifest itself in a box to be bought or even in a line 
drawn in the gravel. As Huizinga puts it, “we find play present everywhere as a well-
defined quality of action which is different from ‘ordinary life’.”81 While it is sometimes 
hard for a media scholar to see the fruitfulness of Huizinga’s point of view, it does not 




2.2. Interactivity – State 
 
In this section, some additional elements of games are underlined. These elements 
elaborate on the definition of ‘game’ offered thus far, some (like ‘virtuality’) by being 
extremely useful, some (like ‘interaction’ and ‘medium’) by being less so. The role of 
simulation, which has traditionally been a very important concept for game scholars, in 
addition to its relation to game space, however, will be more fully discussed only in 
connection to electronic games. 
                                                 
79 Poole, Stephen (2007, 291). 
80 Poole, Stephen (2007, 279). 
81 Huizinga, Johan (1970, 22). 
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Interactivity | Meaning 
 
Perhaps surprisingly, the defining aspect of games and the most salient difference 
between games and other forms of art, entertainment and/or narrative is not interactivity, 
but the existence of rules.82 When ’interaction’ is under scrutiny in game studies, 
discussion often turns to light switches and the like.83 The term is notoriously hard to 
define, but this section aims to show that it is also a fairly useless one in the context in 
question. This is the case especially in relation to computers and thus to electronic games, 
since it offers no additional value to their description.84 ‘Interactivity’ might even be 
harshly described as a pure marketing term much like ‘multimedia’, whose meaning has 
long become obsolete in any sensible discourse due to further technological advancement. 
Additionally, talking about interaction often positions the player-subject (or any kind of 
‘user’) primarily as a consumer.85 One has to keep in mind that as a buzz word for 
causality, ‘interactive’ has still been rather a trendy word in the recent years. This is a fact 
can be discerned in media registers across the world. In media studies, additionally, there 
has been a constant struggle between formal accounts of interactivity and its functional 
definitions, which are mutually contrasting at best.86 To make the term even less helpful 
for this thesis, the definition for ‘game state’ does not equal ‘things that can be interacted 
with in game space’.87
 
If we look at electronic games specifically, their interactivity is always a question of 
interface, because the interface of a game is the only element that enables the user to 
influence the media object – that is in fact the defining characteristic of an interface. 
Interface in the broad sense, on the other hand, is not a thing whose nature is determined 
purely by technology or medium: a film is not interactive at the local theatre, but can be 
seen as such at home. Electronic games can have completely different interfaces both 
                                                 
82 Eskelinen, Markku (2005, 78). 
83 See e.g. Costikyan, Greg (2002, 11). 
84 Manovich, Lev (2001,55). 
85 Parikka, Jussi (2004, 93). 
86 Myers, David (2003b, 75-6). 
87 This matter is returned to on several occasions later in the thesis. 
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from each other88 and basically the same game necessarily has a different kind of 
interface in electronic and non-electronic form. Thus even with games in general, the 
situation is quite similar to computers: according to Costikyan, calling a game an 
‘interactive game’ (just like calling a computer an ‘interactive computer’) is redundant, 
because the state of the game in any case changes in response to a meaningful act by the 
player-subject.89
 
Despite his willingness to see interactivity also outside the domain of electronic games, 
Costikyan chooses to leave objects like crossword puzzles outside the scope of games, 
because puzzles are allegedly static as opposed to being interactive.90 The division seems 
an artificial one, since if puzzles were inherently static, there would not be any way to 
solve them, or at least there would not be anything to show for the solution.91 In 
connection to this, game researcher Lisbeth Klastrup offers a highly useful and simplistic 
insight, which describes interaction as an event, which “establishes a relation between 
two autonomous agents and results in an altered state of either one or both agents.”92 
When a particular interactive or any other kind of event takes place in ludic space, it in 
fact results in what Costikyan calls “changes in the game-state”.93 Thus he fails to see 
that if a letter is added into the grid of a puzzle, it does indeed change things in that space: 
if the right letter was added, the solution is that much closer; if it was not, the solution is 
actually farther away than before adding the letter. Admittedly, the idea of playing a 
crossword puzzle instead of filling in one is more obvious when the puzzle is in an 
electronic form, for instance on a computer screen. Be that as it may, because of the 
emptiness of ‘interaction’ as a term, this thesis will avoid using it from now on, replacing 
it later with the relationship between ‘interface’ and ‘agency’, the ‘how’ and ‘what’ of 
performing in an environment.94
 
                                                 
88 Nintendo Wii’s controllers and Sony Playstation’s EyeToy cameras are good examples of this. 
89 Costikyan, Greg (2002, 11). 
90 Costikyan, Greg (2002, 10). 
91 Temporal aspects of gaming are more closely looked at later in the thesis (section ‘Event | State’). 
92 Klastrup, Lisbeth (2002, 334). 
93 Costikyan, Greg (2002, 10). 
94 Wilhelmsson, Ulf (2001, 143). 
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To partly redeem Costikyan, however, he does bring forward another interesting point by 
defining “decision making” as “interaction with a purpose”.95 This connects the idea of 
interaction with the struggle to reach in-game goals and with the meanings the game 
structure creates, which he calls “endogenous meanings” since they are “caused by 
factors inside the […] system.”96 This is close to what one would call, if desired, diegetic 
meaning. For example, the huge majority of meanings created in Chess could be called 
endogenous or diegetic, since the game mechanics are so predominant for the game. Still, 
the king is the most valuable pawn of all; this relation to the real world can be considered 
extradiegetic, even though it is the rules of the game that make the king so irreplaceable. 
Additionally, one’s opponent can be somebody one knows, which adds to the semiotic 
processes involved in a game of Chess. Thus deeming a meaning as diegetic is often a 
dangerous point of view, as meanings always mix with other texts and contexts as well.97 
That is why we would like to, in addition to using Costikyan’s term “endogenous 
meaning”, offer a related one of ‘endogenous goal’ to refer to in-game goals. 
 
As mentioned many times by now, all games have goals. Those goals are intrinsic to the 
experience of play, which means that the meanings produced by games have to be 
interpreted first and foremost within the game space in question. Endogenous meanings 
in any separated space are of the real world,98 but not for it; making decisions during 
gaming forces the player-subject to primarily utilise the meanings that refer to the ludic 
space in question,99 in other words ‘functional meanings’ of things within the ludic 
space.100 For instance, let us imagine an obstacle in a given game space. Let us also say 
that the obstacle is a baroque door to the other side of which the player-subject or her 
avatar must get. Identifying the obstacle as a door as well as the need to step through it 
are both processes brought about by functional endogenous meanings, which are part of 
the structure of the ludic space. The key to the door is held by a person or a character 
nearby, who wears extravagant 17th century clothing. The connection between the door 
                                                 
95 Costikyan, Greg (2002, 11). 
96 Costikyan, Greg (2002, 22), quoting a dictionary himself. 
97 This aspect will be further discussed later in relation to game space. 
98 Aarseth, Espen (2001, 162). 
99 Primary does not have to mean ‘more interesting’ or ‘more probable’. 
100 Rodriguez, Hector (2006). 
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and the character exists on a real world level as a part of European history, but the player-
subject does not have to notice or even know about it, because looking everywhere and 
asking everybody in that particular limited space results in obtaining the key just as well. 
If the player-subject noticed the hint, however, the gaming experience does become that 
much richer. 
 
This idea can naturally be applied to any kind of semiotic process, for example 
experiencing a film. The foremost meanings are those that enable the viewer to make 
sense of the movie, because otherwise the production of other additional meanings is 
compromised. In Titanic, understanding that Bruce Ismay’s101 insistence to make record 
time across the Atlantic was one of the main reasons for the accident adds both to its 
tragic elements as well as to the fact that the ship itself has later in history been seen as a 
symbol for man’s hubris in the face of nature’s might. These meanings are, while basic, 
still secondary. The difference with games is that identifying certain endogenous aspects 
of a given virtual space is a condition for the emergence of subsequent events and states 
in that space. One cannot play ball if one thinks a ball is just a metaphor for ‘anything can 
happen’. As mentioned above, this is the element that is typically considered to make 
games as a unique medium. 
 
 
Mediality | Immediacy 
 
The line of thought we have been following about gameness leads to the aforementioned 
discovery that the most fundamental difference between electronic games and other 
audiovisual media is not that the subject can affect the narrative created, but the primacy 
of rules in games. Defining game in this way naturally raises the question of electronic 
games as a medium. While it is sometimes problematic from the player-subject’s point of 
                                                 
101 Managing Director of the White Star Line, played by Jonathan Hyde. The Titanic Historical Society, 
Inc.: www.titanichistoricalsociety.org/articles/ismay.asp & The Internet Movie Database: 
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0120338/fullcredits#cast 
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view to see games as a medium, as something that mediates, it is more useful to see 
games as a form of experience, as a perspective, as has been also discussed above.102
 
When comparing gaming with narrative, Aarseth emphasises the point that there really is 
no “medium of the computer game”, because even electronic games do not fall under one 
kind of technology “with one fixed set of capabilities”.103 Aarseth points out, and 
correctly so, that electronic games have multiple forms and are thus likely to be seen as a 
fragmented field aesthetically, which according to him leads to games not being 
considered as an art form, but “at best, a somewhat definable cultural genre.”104 This can 
be said of most spaces and environments created via computers, making them a 
multidimensional media domain reigned by audiovisual forms of expression and the 
relevant institutions.105 However, most art forms can be seen as a combination of 
different media anyway,106 which even further undermines the need to posit any media-
essentialist outlook on games in the first place. 
 
Thus the essential gameness of a thing (even an electronic one) does not come to light in 
relation to aspects like medium or aesthetics, but in relation to the player-subject’s 
experience of play. Media scholar Jukka Sihvonen touches upon this matter in connection 
to technology’s ability and goal to make the mediating factor in a communicative act to 
diminish or even to disappear completely. “Välitön”, the ‘immediate’ (something without 
a mediating factor, if you will) refers to the experience, not to the possible involvement 
or intrusion of a medium.107 If we did not look at electronic games as a medium, we 
could surely get closer to the ludologist ideal of games purely as play. The essence of a 
gaming experience is, after all, in its pervasiveness, its immediacy. 
 
                                                 
102 Actually, seeing electronic games as a medium presupposes their narrativity to a greater degree. Even if 
narrative is not considered as a structuring method applicable for everything, something mediated, a 
representation, lends itself more generously to the approach in question. 
103 Aarseth, Espen (2004a, 46). 
104 Ibid. 
105 Sihvonen, Jukka (1995, 91). 
106 Carroll, Noël (1996, 51). 
107 Sihvonen, Jukka (1995, 83-4). 
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Keeping the ultimate goal of the thesis in mind, this opens interesting new points of view 
to narrativizing play. Consider this quote from Murray, which emphasises narrativity 
over mediality. 
 
Eventually all successful storytelling technologies become “transparent”: we lose 
consciousness of the medium and see neither print nor film but only the power of 
the story itself. If digital art reaches the same level of expressiveness as these 
older media, we will no longer concern ourselves with how we are receiving the 
information.108
 
It seems that narrative might be following on games’ footsteps by becoming not just more 
and more medium-free, but also more and more medium-less to a larger degree. “Digital 
media that strive for transparency and immediacy” create “the desire to get past the limits 
of representation and to achieve the real”, which “is defined in terms of […] 
experience”.109 This will be an important point later when electronic games are looked at 
in relation to the narratives they create, especially when it is rather paradoxically noted 
that ‘the real past the representation’ is actually only real in the virtual space in question 
and that the more transparent and natural the interface in that virtual space has been 
constructed, the more pervasive the gaming experience actually becomes for the player-
subject. 
 
However, since narratives characteristically unfold merely on authorial juice with little 
input from the subject in terms of advancement, all meanings produced by games are 
always more heavily endogenous by nature in the first place. This is one of the main 
reasons that games themselves are less like a unified group of objects and more like 
unique vehicles for gaming experiences and for meanings created in these individual 
ludic spaces. As previously referred to on several occasions, there are no conditions 
outside the scope of the gaming experience itself which can be used to group all games 
under the same heading. 
 
 
                                                 
108 Murray, Janet H. (1997, 26). 
109 Bolter, Jay David & Grusin, Richard (1999, 53). 
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Virtuality | Space 
 
Virtuality can be considered to be inherently connected to the relation between what is 
and what is made of it.110 In the context of this thesis, ‘virtual’ is used to refer to the 
good-hearted juxtaposition of reality (what is) and gaming (what is made of it). The core 
of any game includes the game space, which is always (without exception) partly virtual 
and thus always (without exception) distinguishable from reality. The events of a game 
always take place in a game space, whose real nature is determined by the virtual 
elements of the gaming experience in question. In other words, the player-subject acts in 
a game space as a physical body (e.g. Football), through an avatar (Super Mario Bros) or 
without any clearly definable figure or form (Tetris, Chess). When we later take the 
plunge to electronic games, however, the inherent virtuality of a ludic experience 
becomes more apparent as the significance of both the screen and the interface is more 
heavily emphasised. 
 
To put it in very crude terms, traditionally space has been seen either as a something one 
can move through or something one can think through. These points of view naturally 
complement each other and together illuminate some of the properties of game space. 
Generally speaking, a space offers a context for interpretation, but ‘moving’ in a given 
space always emphasises the placeness of space. In the context of this thesis, ‘place’ 
refers both to real world locations and game worlds like EverQuest’s Norrath or Ultima-
series’ Britannia in electronic games.111 Space, however, is a more encompassing concept. 
 
Space is a necessary a priori representation, which underlies all outer intuitions. 
We can never represent to ourselves the absence of space, though we can quite 
well think it as empty of objects.112  
 
                                                 
110 Ryan, Marie-Laure (2001a, 45). 
111 Like ’ludic space’ and ’game space’, ‘place’ and ‘world’ basically refer to the same thing in the text, 
although ‘world’ is only used in relation to electronic games for clarity’s sake. ‘Environment’, with a 
slightly different denotation from ‘world’, is also primarily used in connection to electronic games. 
112 Kant, Immanuel (2003, 68), emphasis in the original. 
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This Kant’s theorem, in which space serves as a part of the framework that enables all 
experience, applies also to game spaces. The only difference is explained by the spatial 
hierarchy created by different kinds of experiences. A game space is a virtual coating that 
is always imposed on other space, making an insular game space an impossibility.113 
Even the most virtual of spaces originates from a dominating space and thus exists as 
dependent of it. Consequently, the relationship between Kant’s space and experience is 
basically congruent with that of game space and gaming experience with one major 
difference, which is that game space is a result of gaming, not vice versa. 
 
A ludic space can also be seen in two different ways, either as the relationship between 
the author (in the form of rules) and the players (typically in a certain place) or as the sum 
of sequences of events and states. The perspective is free for the choosing, since both 
points of view refer essentially to the same thing: the magic circle. After Huizinga, the 
magic circle has been taken to mean all spaces that are “forbidden spots, isolated, hedged 
round, hallowed, within which special rules obtain”, “temporary worlds within the 
ordinary world, dedicated to the performance of an act apart.”114 The magic circle is 
admittedly a problematic concept. 
 
In some cases (like an official Football match), the effect of the magic circle is very real, 
in others (like playing with a football in the park), it is much more illusory.115 Even with 
a clearly limited place, like a Football pitch, the game space leaks in rain from the sky, 
sounds and streakers from the spectator stands and sometimes even eagle-owls from the 
rafters. The same applies for spaces that are more explicitly virtual as well, as it is clear 
for anyone who has tried to play a new PC-game like Crysis on a computer with an old 
processor and/or an old display adapter. The circle’s leaking can be experienced as 
significant in the opposite way as well. Player-subjects have been known to imitate their 
in-game actions in reality, like was allegedly the case, for instance, in the so-called 
                                                 
113 Unlike with places, the virtuality degree of a space is a complex question: which is ‘more virtual’ as a 
space, a rich fantasy world with a clearly limited place depicted on a screen or a really simple game played 
without any limitation in regard to the place in the real world? 
114 Huizinga, Johan (1970, 28-9) 
115 Literally ’in-game’, from inlusio, illudere, inludere. Huizinga, Johan (1970, 30). 
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Doom-killings in Kentucky in 1998.116 Where the overconfident hockey-defenseman let 
his gaming experience get mixed up with elements of general play, the real-life shooter in 
question mixed gaming with non-gaming with tragic results. 
 
More theoretical problems arise when discussion turns to pervasive games, in relation to 
which the game space is even less like an actual container, but more like a sieve. 117 In 
this respect, defining a game space relating to its rules and as sequences of events and 
states is highly necessary. The endogenous nature of the meaning-making process is 
always compromised in a ludic context because of the intertwining of “the lived, 
discursive and contextual aspects of space and reality” with the said space. 118 For 
instance, in UEFA’s119 Champions League the knockout stages are organized with two 
legged head-to-head matches, where the final result is determined by the combined score 
of those two matches. The ludic space, created here not in relation to the rules of Football 
per se but in regard to UEFA’s competition regulations, expands two stadiums, because 
the result of the former match directly affects the meanings created in the latter. Thus the 
goal of a single match might not be to win at all. 
 
In any case, this idea of stretching the game space is not as strange as it might seem at 
first, if it is paralleled with sequels and their expansion of narrative space for example in 
film. Be that as it may, a space should always be kept conceptually separated from the 
place it contains. 
 
Space is an abstraction – nevertheless, it provides a context for the reality to 
actualise. These actualizations of space, “places”, can be understood intuitively 
and experienced bodily, through sensory perception. The relationship between 
space and place is constantly negotiated and dynamically processed.120
 
                                                 
116 Bignell, Jonathan (2002, 218). 
117 For a discussion of ‘container space’ in electronic games, see: Günzel, Stephan. 2005. Through the Eyes 
of an Ego-Shooter: Pictorial presentation and construction of space in “first-person perspective”-computer 
games. Online: www.stephan-guenzel.de/Texte/Guenzel_Egoshooter.pdf 
118 Saukko, Paula (2003, 166). 
119 UEFA stands for The Union of European Football Associations. 
120 Sihvonen, Tanja (2003, 268). 
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In other words, place can be seen as “the concretisation of space”.121 However, it is 
possible that the rules of a game define the place only in a very cursory way, in which 
case the place might be wholly embedded in reality, as with pervasive games. It is also 
possible that the same game exists in different contexts; one can play Chess both 
electronically and on a traditional board. Regardless of the size or the nature of the ludic 
space, it is bound by rules that offer the context for the meanings created by the game. In 
other words, rules are on a higher level than space in the hierarchy controlling the 
semiotic processes in ludic situations. Objects are thus made meaningful primarily 
through the rules of the game, which also include the game’s endogenous goals, as 
previously discussed on many occasions.122
 
Game spaces that are embedded in reality without an explicit virtual place are naturally 
more susceptible to conditions and rules of the real world. In an electronic game like 
Hitman, it is possible that the only goal is to murder people; in the board game Hungry 
Hungry Hippos this sort of behaviour would certainly be frowned upon, even though it is 
not mentioned in the rules. In a Football match, rain is a potential whose manifestation is 
determined by the weather; in Pro Evolution Soccer 5, the possible representation of rain 
depends on the rules of the game itself. 
 
The meanings emerging from the virtual are not primarily connected to the real, but to 
other virtual meanings. Games are always virtual to a certain degree, as their rules and 
goals separate them from the everyday experience of life. Eskelinen, for whom a game as 
its simplest is “a system of means and goals, in which there exists procedural rules to 
manipulate its resources”,123 does not mention the origin of these elements. The reason 
for this is the virtuality of any game, since the system Eskelinen mentions in his 
definition can originate from anywhere: from a 1000-page rule book or the imagination 
of the sole player-subject.  
 
                                                 
121 Ibid. 
122 This issue will still be further looked later in connection to narrativization. 
123 Eskelinen (2005, 78), my translation from Finnish: “keinojen ja päämäärien systeemi [...], jossa on 
proseduraaliset säännöt pelivälineen manipuloinnille”. 
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Thus, the formality of the game is naturally a matter of degree as well. In case of 
shooting hoops on a backyard, the virtuality (and at the same time, the gameness) can 
originate, for instance, from an agreement between two people to take five attempts each 
from a given free throw line to see who scores more. After nine consecutive successes by 
the player-subjects, the last throw does not hit the target. Why? Not because there might 
have perhaps been some meagre prize for the winner, but because it was clear that 
missing the last shot would result in defeat. Admittedly, it is a question of how to deal 
with pressure more than literal meanings, but the pressure itself is born of meanings 
created by the game. If the two had been just shooting hoops without playing the game 
described above, it would have been much less likely for the player-subject in question to 
miss his fifth shot. After all, he did make the first four. 
 
Gaming also has a tendency to transform meanings of objects in the real world. Let us 
take playing Hide and Seek as another example. The game takes place within a limited 
area, usually indoors, and there are different goals for different players-subjects. What 
happens after the game’s initial state is that pieces of furniture transform into visual 
obstructions, parents and pets turn into potential whistle-blowers and so on. The sitting 
capacity of a sofa is secondary in the necessarily virtual game space, because the number 
of people that fit to sit on it is not directly connected with the sofa’s functional aspects in 
the context in question; signification renders perception.124 What is especially noteworthy 
is that that these transformations take place regardless of the goal a given player-subject 
has in the game. 
 
These processes are dissimilar from just imagining things as different and thus result in 
interpretations completely different from non-ludic ones. After the game of Hide and 
Seek is over, the ludic place and everything in it turns back into being ‘just’ a house in the 
real world. As discussed before, this kind of privileging of functional meaning is unique 
for games. The virtual clearly adds to the real it exists in relation to, thus creating a desire 
towards it.125 The desire for gaming is connected with the separation games enjoy from 
                                                 
124 Metz, Christian (1974, 17). 
125 Sihvonen, Jukka (1995, 93). 
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the real world.126 Together they give rise to ludic motivation, which usually results in 
much more than merely saying ‘thirty-four’ in a situation in which the highest number 
wins. 
 
Finally, it must be emphasised that the player-subject does not have complete access to 
the game space he is a part of. In cases like Backgammon, it is entirely possible to 
perceive all the meanings in regard to a given game state provided that one just is 
attentive enough, but on many occasions the human inability to comprehensibly perceive 
the occurrences ‘taking place’ necessarily results in an only partial understanding of the 
game space and the events within it. To summarise the difference, game spaces are 
always partly virtual because of their relationship and dependency on real space. Game 
places are virtual only in case of electronic games and their derivatives. Game places are, 
however, always parts of a game space; in other words, a virtual space can and often does 
hold within itself an actual place. 
 
 
Event | State 
 
Now, at last, it is time to discuss the reasons why looking at spatiality (as opposed to 
temporality) has been the main focus thus far in the thesis.127 Although dealing with 
space and time separately despite their interdependency might seem risky at best, an 
explanation for this point of view can be found in the nature of ludic states. Gaming 
experiences always involve a special context, a space, but they do not necessarily create a 
distinct meaningful temporal dimension to go with it. An example might be in order here. 
A game of Chess, played by a middle-aged couple, Adam and Eve, has lasted for three 
years. For all this time, the elaborately ornamented pawns have just been standing on the 
wooden board in the middle of a glass table in their living room. One day, walking by the 
board, Eve realises it is her turn to move and enters the game space, the pawns 
                                                 
126 Costikyan, Greg (2002, 17). 
127 For a discussion of temporality in games, see: Juul, Jesper. 2004. Introduction to Game Time. In 
Wardrip-Fruin, Noah & Harrigan, Pat (eds.). First Person: New media as story, performance and game. 
Cambridge & London: The MIT Press, 131-42. 
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consequently transitioning from the decorative to the functional. Adam having just left 
for a work-related trip, she takes her time; it makes no difference in regard to the game 
space how long she ponders for her next move (especially if we take into account the 
extensive time that has passed in the real world after the game’s initial state). After a long 
consideration, she moves the queen forward on the board to finish off Adam’s remaining 
bishop. 
 
The point of the story is not that you can play any game for years or that Chess in its 
tournament format is not a valid variation of the game in question, but that while the 
existence of time is a condition for any experience, temporality in itself is not as intrinsic 
to gaming in general as spatiality. Admittedly, time passes in ludic spaces too, but it does 
not necessarily mean anything; as in the example above, time operates more firmly in the 
dominant space of the non-virtual, in other words the real world. There are, of course, 
countless numbers of games that have artificial time limits or those that have an emphasis 
on acting quickly for other reasons, but gaming, as an experience, does not necessarily 
alter time as it does space, although the sense for both might be blurred by it all the 
same.128
 
In regard to this discussion, it is essential to take a closer look at the relationship between 
an event and a state. Basically, playing results in events in a game space, which in turn 
result in changes in the state. After the game’s initial state has been broken by events, 
both a sequence of events and a sequence of states are created. These sequences exist in 
parallel to each other, events representing change and states stability, a given state 
consisting of events in progress at that particular moment in time. As discussed before, 
there does not necessarily have to be an event in progress in a ludic space: in that case, 
the state is eternal until broken by an act of gaming or destroyed by a real world 
happening. In a way, events in space do charge a state with potential for change, but it is 
never reached in that particular state. 
 
                                                 
128 Again, this idea is connected with Csíkszentmihályi’s concept of flow, which is not under discussion in 
this thesis. 
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Considering an event as some relatively minimal occurrence, like tightening one’s grip of 
the bat before hitting the ball in Baseball, illuminates the necessarily unchanging nature 
of a state. There is an infinite number of states paralleling the event chain of tightening 
the grip on the bat, every one of which having the potential for certain consequent states. 
The tighter the grip, for instance, the more likely it usually is for the batter to hit the ball. 
Unlike states, events in ludic spaces can be and often are simultaneous: while the batter 
tightens his grip of the bat, the pitcher might be gripping the ball in a similar fashion at 
the same time. The typical simultaneity of events makes game states collages of events 
and their interrelationships. 
  
To put the previous argument differently, because of their nature, ludic states do not exist 
primarily in time; they actually exist in spite of it. In a similar way, a ludic space that 
overlaps with real space while still holding onto its virtuality, a given game state remains 
unscathed by the change brought on by events; an event, defined by change happening 
within a space, does not change a state in that space, but gives birth to a brand new one. 
Thus game states have a temporal dimension only through the events they exist in parallel 
with, all of them still residing within the ludic space in question. This makes space a 
more essential component of gaming than time. In the realm of stagnation Eve entered 
when sitting by the Chess board, there was no temporal dimension to experience, but only 
a spatial one. Inside it, a single state carrying all the already materialised moves and all 
the potential for consequent ones could be found within, including the move where Eve’s 
queen takes Adam’s bishop. 
 
There is one more important aspect of ludic states that is useful to keep in mind. Their 
nature as something absolute and unchanging presupposes a degree of formality that can 
only be achieved via a close connection with the most formal element of any game, 
namely the rules; states are only manifested in relation to rules. This means that some of 
the events inside a ludic space exist beyond the scope of the sequence of states, for 
example scratching one’s head during a time out in a Basketball match. The acting 
player-subject is within the game space, but the event is not meaningful in relation to the 
rules of the game and therefore, it does not produce a new ludic state – it is thus only 
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meaningful as an event in relation to space. Another player-subject perceiving the event 
can still give it significance in the ludic context in question, if she so desires. 
Determining which actions actually are significant to a given game state naturally 
involves interpretation. This is also one of the reasons why individual experience is so 
essential for defining ‘gaming’: what ever the game, the complexity of the game space 
results in only a subjective view on events, and consequently states. 
 
As discussed above, a sequence of ludic states forms an absolute chain of event collages 
that positions objects in relation to the rules of the game. In other words, having complete 
access to a given state is to have the ultimate answer to the question: what is the going on 
in the game at a particular moment? Game states usually come in infinite numbers and 
their sequence is thus never truly fully perceived, of course the degree in which it can 
happen largely depending on the dynamics of the space. To clarify the argument, we can 
compare Tic-Tac-Toe’s space with a one created by a live action role-playing game, in 
which the player-subject does not usually have even remotely complete access to any of 
the game states beyond the initial state, not to mention the space as a whole. This also 
puts an emphasis on the flickering nature of ludic experience, which can be ended at any 
given moment as a consequence of events in reality, for instance a fight in the audience, a 
fire, a power failure, the player-subject losing interest and so on. 
 
As a side note, it is also quite useful to notice a characteristic of the relationship between 
space and place. Typically, the more explicit the virtuality of a game place is, the less 
there are events that do not result in a change in the game state, as is the case with 
electronic games. This is because of the aforementioned fact, according to which games 
with spaces more fully embedded in real space are usually more susceptible to real life 
rules and occurrences. Consequently, a place more heavily virtual by nature is more 
affected by the rules of the game itself, which results in more significance being put on 
any event in the place in question. For instance, the event of physically moving a pawn 
on an actual board in Chess is an event that ‘takes place’ for the most part in space, not 
the place itself, in other words the board. 
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To briefly summarise, time acts only as a condition for a sequence of events, which in 
turn creates a parallel sequence of game states. This is true for any game. The ludic space 
that is created by a gaming experience is made of the combination of events and states, 
both of which relate to rules and goals to a degree: events less so than states. While an 
individual game state is absolute, completely void of flux and all-compassing in relation 
to the rules of the game, an event can be something that does not have any relationship to 
the game rules, but can still be signified in the game space. But why go through all this 
trouble in distinguishing events from states? One of the reasons is the previously 
mentioned fact that game spaces do not necessarily have to be in a constant state of flux, 
like it is the case with Sudoku or the game of Chess used as an example.129 Thus it is 
inherent for gaming to pay more attention to states than events, as the new altered 
location of a pawn always takes precedence over the event of moving it. In other words, 
the emphasis is in the changes in states brought on by the paralleling events, not events in 
themselves. 
 
Because the relationship between game states equals the relationship between what came 
before and what comes after in that game space, they create an arc, a sequence, in which 
only some of the parts are perceived, signified and ultimately narrativized. Being a good 
Chess player thus takes the meaning of being able to predict the development of future 
events by looking at the past better than average players, which necessarily requires 
narrativizing the state sequence in question. 
 
Be that as it may, looking at a sequence of states as opposed to a sequence of events gives 
us an opportunity to discuss the gaming experience in a whole new way, since one of the 
most interesting parts of the above discussion in regard of this thesis is that while the 
members of an audience tend to narrativize a game as a sequence of events because of 
their inability to really access the ludic space, the player-subjects do it using the sequence 
of states. The result is two completely different narrative sequences. Before we finally 
make the transition to narrativizing, however, we must first take a brief look at the 
narrative’s building materials. 
                                                 
129 Many games in which player-subjects take turns to act can also be included in this category. 
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2.3. Sign – Narrativity 
 
Sign | Interpretation 
 
There are no objects that do not produce some kind of meaning. Even the functionality of 
objects becomes meaningful in an inevitable process of semantization,130 since “[t]o 
rediscover a non-signifying object, one would have to imagine a utensil absolutely 
improvised and with no similarity to an existing model.”131 Thus every object and act 
imaginable, mediated or not, is a sign in the perpetual processes of signification and 
representation.132 However, the ambivalence of ‘representation’ as a term even when 
applied to more traditional modes of communication, wavering both between surrogacy 
and likeness as well as between different modes of again-presenting something, makes it 
a problematic concept in the context of game studies, where the term would have to be 
reshaped yet again. This is true especially for the first half of the thesis, in which 
subjective experience has been the focus, not any object that does the representing. Thus 
we choose to disregard the term for the time being, advancing from signs to narratives 
through the concept of interpretation. Representation will, in any case, be examined in 
connection to electronic games, where the treatment of the concept will bring about more 
tangible results. 
 
In Barthesian terms, signs can be crudely divided into linguistic and semiological 
signs.133 Game spaces contain both kinds of signs much like any other space, even 
though they are not exactly made of signs themselves, but of experiencing them. When 
we get to electronic games in specific, the code, and consequently the vast majority of 
signs in those spaces, are authorial by nature; 134 in terms of gaming in general, however, 
this is not usually the case. Because of the multidimensional nature of both signs and 
                                                 
130 Barthes, Roland (1990, 41). 
131 Barthes, Roland (1990, 41-2). 
132 Taylor, Lisa & Willis, Andrew (2006, 39). 
133 Barthes, Roland (1990, 41). This division will also be briefly touched upon in relation to electronic 
games. 
134 Originating from an author, a designer, etc. This topic is elaborated on again in short in the next chapter. 
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ludic spaces, an individual sign interpreted by the player-subject can be positioned either 
within, without or somewhere in-between in relation to space. The question of semiotic 
primacy and functionality, which has already been touched upon repeatedly during the 
course of this thesis, rears its head again. 
 
Salen and Zimmerman bring forward four basic Peircean ideas that constitute a sign in 
connection to their discussion of meaning in games. They are listed here and fully 
adopted in the discussion to follow. 
 
1. A sign represents something other than itself. 
2. Signs are interpreted. 
3. Meaning results when a sign is interpreted. 
4. Context shapes interpretation.135
 
Umberto Eco points out that “the meaning of a sign-vehicle”136 is a semantic unit which 
is posited within a semantic system in a precise way.137 In other words, the sign-vehicle 
is automatically posited in a certain location in its semantic context, which makes it 
unique in its own right and provides the context for signification. This fact parallels the 
idea of game states, where every sign-vehicle can be posited only once in a given state 
because of its absolute stagnancy. A state presents itself to the player-subject as a kind of 
umbrella-sign, outside of which there is no need for interpretation in that ludic space in 
regard to its rules. 
 
Let us once more emphasise the idea of primacy of certain meanings in games. “The 
mark of a circle (O) in the game of Tic-Tac-Toe, for instance, represents not only an 
action by player “O” (as opposed to player “X”) but also the capture of a certain square 
within the game’s nine-square grid.”138 The primary, functional meaning of “O” is that it 
is different from “X” and it is located somewhere in game space; the sign’s meaning, the 
location on the board in relation to other signs in other locations, is strictly demarcated by 
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the semantic context including the goal of the game, which originates from rules and 
manifests itself in the ludic space and its states. 
 
Even without the fluctuation brought on by events in ludic spaces, meaning is always 
procedural by nature139 and should be looked at accordingly. In the ludic context, the 
process in question manifests itself in the sequence of game states for the player-subject. 
Algirdas Julien Greimas felicitously calls the viewing of things as signs beyond just their 
‘being’ looking at their “semiotic status”.140 This happens in a similar way while 
perceiving a game state or, for instance, watching a film or looking at a painting, since in 
all of these cases, the sign-vehicles themselves are unaffected and unaltered by the 
perception they are submitted to. There is no reason for game states not to be seen as a 
kind of language as easily as, to give a Barthesian example, fashion.  
 
Media semiotician Jonathan Bignell, for one, applies the Saussurian terms of ‘langue’ and 
‘parole’ to games by pointing out that the langue of the game is all the possible acts 
allowed by the rules (the system) and the parole one of those acts (a particular 
manifestation).141 Following that trail of thought, any sign system, langue, can be 
investigated through its parole.142 This is reflected in the langue of games, rules, whose 
primacy is apparent in game studies in general. Rules are the code key for signification in 
gaming, since “the roles of signs as members of code groupings means that many signs 
are heavily loaded with a significance which comes from the code in which they are 
used.”143 In other words, the signifying elements found within a particular game should 
not be decontextualised under any circumstances, not while gaming nor when studying 
gaming. 
 
To follow Bignell’s lead in applying linguistic theories to games, let us discuss gaming in 
connection to semiotician Jon Barwise. According to him, a linguistic sign cluster carries 
meanings on three different levels: the meaning within language, the utterance’s meaning 
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as an action, and the meaning that is attempted to be conveyed.144 Thus the sentence “I 
am a philosopher” means something in the system of English language, conveys a 
meaning as an event and tries to say something for the subject of the utterance.145 What 
follows is an application of this division to a Football match. 
 
The right forward moves down the field to approach a mid-fielder who is dribbling the 
ball on the same side of the field, a dozen or so metres closer to their team’s own goal. At 
the same time, the right winger starts running up the side of the field, passing the forward, 
who is going into the opposite direction, on his way. Let us now look at the forward’s 
actions as semiological signs, by equating “I am a philosopher” with the couple of 
running steps towards the object of the ‘utterance’, the mid-fielder. Firstly, we might 
conclude that within the system that is Football, he is trying to free himself from his 
nearby opponent to have enough room to receive a pass from the mid-fielder. Secondly, 
the event of the forward’s action means that there is more room in the area he moved 
from, which in turn created room for the right winger to advance more freely. Thirdly, the 
forward knew that one of the opponents was going to follow him to try and intercept the 
ball if it were passed to him, which the forward counted on would not happen; thus the 
meaning that is attempted to be conveyed by the forward is not “pass me the ball since 
I am now freer to receive it”, but “pass the ball to the right winger to whom I have now 
created a better chance to advance”. Thus 
 
the generation of meaning does not first take the form of the production of 
utterances and their combination in discourse; it is relayed, in the course of its 
trajectory, by narrative structures and it is these that produce meaningful 
discourse articulated in utterances.146
 
In other words, the forward does not only utter something by taking the running steps, but 
also structures the utterance in the way that it would be a meaningful one to the mid-
fielder. The more nuanced aspects of this communication strategy, of course, had already 
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been structured by the coach on the training field long before the actual act of gaming on 
the pitch. 
 
Thus we see how the idea of a sign can easily be applied to a gaming situation, as all 
events and actions of other player-subjects are parts of the signification process during a 
gaming experience. ‘A couple of running steps’ is not just moving in the ludic space, but 
both an event that changes the game state and an act that submits itself to signification. In 
addition to being always a demand that has to be reacted to, meaning must also be 
available for access immediately, in the present.147 The cumulation of individual states in 
space creates within it a microcosmic “discourse on meaning, […] a great paraphrase that 
in its own way develops all earlier articulations of meaning.”148 Previous meanings not 
only affect subsequent meanings in ludic spaces just like in any other space, but they are 
also often intentional in some way; in the words of philosopher Gregory Currie, “to 
interpret is to hypothesize about the intentional causes of whatever it is that is being 
interpreted.”149 Whether intentions are authorial by nature or originated from another 
player-subject, does not matter in itself in regard to the principles according to which a 
player-subject picks some signs as more meaningful than others in the two parallel ludic 
sequences of events and states. 
 
With multiple player-subjects in the same space, like in the Football example above or in 
any complex game space, there exists a cacophony of utterances, of which the player-
subject is only able to choose some at a given point in time. 
 
When we experience a “story” we must make sense of all the elements in it, so we 
can make conscious selections from among story elements. We make our 
selections on the basis of how central to the story certain elements are and how 
distinctive certain portrayals and action are.150
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These choices partly constitute the process of narrativizing, in which the present acts as a 
vantage point which gives access to the past and the future.151 Actually, this is not far 
from the process of reading, where sentences are seen as “component parts” whose 
combination from different perspectives results in “indications of something that is to 
come”.152
 
Thus, the reader, in establishing […] inter-relations between past, present, and 
future, actually causes the text to reveal its potential multiplicity of connections. 
These connections are the product of the reader’s mind working on the raw 
material of the text […]. 153
 
The cognitive function of narrative form, then, is not just to relate a succession of 
events but body forth an ensemble of interrelationships of many different kinds as 
a single whole.154
 
As we will see next, this process equals narrativizing the sequence of game states in the 
ludic context, in which, as previously repeatedly emphasised, any action is always, to a 
certain degree, teleological by nature. Ironically enough, Aarseth parallels gaming 
experience with real life in order to separate games from stories,155 consequently 




Narrative | Narrativity 
 
Thus we arrive at our destination, the other side of the coin. We began our discussion 
with the juxtaposition of game and narrative in game studies and went on to look at 
gaming in particular. After traversing through the space between, it is finally time to look 
at narratives. Narratives can help us analyze the interrelationship between the gamer and 
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the game,156 the aim of this section being to indicate how basic narratological principles 
can be applied to ludological contexts. During the discussion, it is useful to keep in mind 
that “[n]arrative is both a mode of reasoning and a mode of representation”,157 while also 
being the “primary scheme by means of which hermeneutical meaningfulness is 
manifested.”158
 
’Narrative’ and ‘narrativity’ are perhaps equally hard terms to define as ‘game’ and 
‘gaming’. As done earlier with games, the terms are more fruitful to outline with a group 
of features that remain applicable for all occurrences rather than to seek to define them in 
a concise and waterproof way with a single sentence. Instead of constructing the 
definition to the same degree as in regard to games, some helpful features are borrowed 
below directly from media scholar Marie-Laure Ryan, who points out that “[t]he most 
widely accepted claim about the nature of narrative is that it represents a chronologically 
ordered sequence of states and events”.159
 
 1. Narrativity is independent of the question of fictionality. […] 
2. Narrativity is independent of tellability. 
3. A narrative is a sign with a signifier (discourse) and a signified (story, mental 
image, semantic representation). The signifier can have many different semiotic 
manifestations. […] 
4. The narrativity of a text is located on the level of the signified. Narrativity 
should therefore be defined in semantic terms. The definition should be 
medium-free. 
5. Narrativity is a matter of degree. […] 
6. Narrative representations […] cannot be freely permuted, because they are held 
together in a sequence by relations of cause and effect, and because temporal 
order is meaningful.160
 
In other words, the most crucial aspect of narratives is to see them as semiotic processes 
extending beyond mediality and fictionality, whose manifestations are subject to 
subjective interpretation. Traditionally, in regard to audience, narratives are also the sum 
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of their events.161 The same statement applies equally to games with the exception that 
player-subjects, as mentioned above, experience games as sequences of states as opposed 
to sequences of events. 
 
Despite Ryan’s useful insights, we would like to elaborate a little on the basic elements of 
narrative with the help of narratologist Seymour Chatman while immediately 
contextualising his thoughts to render them more appropriate for gaming. Chatman 
argues that the “transposability” of narratives over any medium reveals the real narrative 
structures to be hidden behind the clusters of sign-vehicles.162 In ludic contexts, these 
structures refer to the rules of games, which include all narrative potentials of the game 
spaces involved via controlling the possible sequences of the game states. Chatman also 
brings forward the fact that transformations in the structure never break their own context, 
but only stretch its boundaries.163 As a result, the narrative structure itself has no 
privileged representation,164 as we can see from games that are created for multiple 
platforms, like, for instance, most of the console games today. It also makes it possible 
for essentially the same game to manifest itself in completely different forms, for instance 
as a board game and an electronic game. Be that as it may, the representation of the 
structure itself is always incomplete, which is another reason for forcing the subject to 
make decisions not just about the parts of the structure that are perceived, but also about 
the parts not even being represented.165 These ‘holes’ result in an infinite amount of 
narrative potential to be taken into account in connection to interpretation, which is 
subjective by nature to begin with. 
 
For neo-formalist David Bordwell, there are three ways of looking at narrative: 
representation, structure and process.166 This thesis concentrates on the latter, “the 
activity of selecting, arranging, and rendering story material”,167 which represents the 
most active mode of those available and at the same time draws a parallel between 
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narrative and meaning in general. Like games, also narratives create their own context. 
Media scholar Marsha Kinder describes the function of narrative both “to create a 
simulacrum of the world” and “to contextualise the meanings of perceptions”.168 The 
subjects inflect “the text with their own personal associations or appropriating it for their 
own pleasures.”169 In the ludic context, the player-subjects interpret the states according 
to their goals which are always in some way imposed on them, but are still naturally 
subject to their own interpretations. 
 
Narrativity, forming narratives, is fundamentally concerned with ”the problem of 
fashioning human experience into a form assimilable to structures of meaning that are 
generally human rather than culture-specific.”170 This process has been typically seen as 
something that recreates rather than creates, since a narrative without some kind of a 
manifestation, a cluster of signs that represents its inherent structures, is allegedly a 
narrative that does not exist. That means that even though the concept of narrativity can 
be applied to gaming, it needs a bit of tinkering. 
 
According to media scholar Veijo Hietala, narrativity can be understood as a concept 
through which reality and its events are made sensible.171 This makes narrative “a 
discursive mode of patterning and interpreting the meaning of perceptions”.172 The 
signification strategy in question structures the perceived both on a temporal continuum 
and as a chain causes and effects.173 In other words, narrativity is equally concerned with 
sequences like ‘the king dies, then the queen dies‘ and ‘the king dies, then the queen dies 
of grief’.174 This is also what a sequence of game states achieves: both the temporal 
succession of events and the causes for its transformations. 
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In the previous section on the production of meaning, we looked at some non-linguistic 
applications for linguistic theorems. According to Greimas, finding narrative structures 
outside natural language 
 
amounts to recognizing and accepting the need for a fundamental distinction 
between two levels of representations and analysis: a apparent level of narration, 
at which the diverse manifestations of narrative are subject to the specific 
requirements of the linguistic substances through which it is expressed, and an 
immanent level, which is a kind of common structural trunk where narrativity is 
located and organized at the stage preceding its manifestation.175
 
In the ludic context, the “immanent level” is located on the level of rules and spaces, 
where the principles laid down in this chapter hold true, regardless of the game. On the 
more apparent level, the material open for narrativization manifests itself in places, 
events and, consequently, in states. The states, emerging from events and structuring the 
space in connection to its rules, are the glue between what is “apparent” and “immanent” 
in a gaming experience. 
 
But how to appreciate the different modes of existence in regard to narrativity, the real 
and the virtual? While the answer is still partly deluding us, it is maybe more fruitful to 
take a second look at the question. Does it matter in terms of making narrative 
connections in a given context whether it is virtual or not? The principles remain the 
same, even if the interpretations vary. In Eco’s words, “the notion of interpretation holds 
for worlds seen as texts as well as texts seen as worlds.”176 Ryan, in turn, describes the 
experience of acting in a virtual world in the following passage: 
 
In an interactive system, a sequential narrative will be automatically created by 
the presence of a user spending a variable amount of time in the virtual world. 
The narrative events will be produced by the actions of the user, and the identity 
of the participant, a continuity experienced by the user as a bond between the self 
and the acting body.177
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As previously discussed in relation to interactivity, “an interactive system” can easily 
refer to any game space (or even any space, for that matter).  The temporal continuum, “a 
sequential narrative” in Ryan’s terms, is “automatically created”, but so it is in non-
virtual spaces as well. “The narrative events” being results of acts by the subject applies 
wholly in any game space. While the temporal sequence is a given in any space, the 
causal mode of a narrative is highly dependent on “the goal of the agent.”178 To apply the 
statement to the ludic context, we see how the stagnation of game states is not at odds 
with the causal nature of the emerging events; temporality and causality can be 
conceptually separated without losing track of often dynamic occurrences of a game 
space. 
 
Let us next take a closer look at narrativizing a gaming experience. Narrative is the 
“discursive mode” 179 that is used in interpreting semiotic objects in ludic spaces. To 
narrativize is to look at the past and project the future, which is a process that a player-
subject is constantly involved in when playing a game. As discussed earlier, 
narrativization presupposes interpretation of signs. Every sign cannot be perceived and 
even from those that are, the player-subject chooses some to be significant enough to be 
included in the interpretation. The game’s goals thus become “the tools that shape 
narrative experience”.180 The player-subject practically always operates with imperfect 
information, although having a clear understanding of the state of a simple game like Tic-
Tac-Toe might be considered as an exception. Because of the nature of the environment 
they are created in, all narratives formed by a player-subject in a ludic context, in other 
words narratives formed in-game, could be called endogenous by nature. However, it is 
more fruitful for future discussions to reserve the term ‘endogenous narrative’ for the 
specific narrative constructions that are formed by the explicit narrative content found 
within a given game space.181
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When a game space is seen as a series of game states and thus as a narrative entirety, both 
explicit and implicit narrative elements are underlined. Most would probably agree on the 
fact that there is no explicit narrative dimension to Chess, but it must still be narrativized 
in order to conform to the needs of gaming. The following example brings forward the 
inherent narrative elements of the beginning of Adam and Eve’s Chess match we talked 
about earlier. The match began as a ‘closed game’, both Eve and Adam moving the 
soldier in front of their queen. After both players moved their knights, they arrived at the 





Playing with white pawns, Eve now has a chance to take the black soldier with her knight, 
which solely in the context of this particular game state would seem to be the most 
beneficial move she could make. Eve decides against it, however, since the move would 
probably mean losing her knight to Adam’s knight and Eve does not see a way to take 
advantage of the sacrifice. The decision is motivated, in addition to the rules and goals of 
the game, also by the game states before the previous move (the black knight coming to 
protect the soldier) as well as the states following the next move (the black knight having 
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a chance to take the white knight). Eve has to project both the past and the future to fulfil 
the needs of her ludic motivation. 
 
Of course, the decision can be seen to be possibly affected by elements originating from 
outside this particular game space, for instance considering Adam as a weak enough 
player to overlook the chance to take Eve’s knight. That does not change the fact that in 
terms of the rules and the space, the game state is absolute and when looked at in the light 
of the goal of the game, it does not really allow Eve to take the black soldier, providing 
that she has interpreted the state well enough to realise that. 
 
In this respect, narrativizing has little to do with explicit narrative elements themselves; 
the emphasis is in making the signs in-game and in the given ‘present’ situation 
meaningful as well as trying to reach endogenous goals as effectively as possible. In 
other words, the ludic narrative is much more a vehicle than a goal in itself. Even in 
games with extremely complex plots, the primary goal of gaming is to excel in the game, 
not to enjoy it as a story. This might seem a generalisation, but it is clear that the 
narrative cannot be enjoyed at all unless in-game advancement is made by the player-
subject. 
 
As we can see from the example above, the narrativizing takes place just before the 
actual gaming act. Also, for instance, a film can be narrativized at any given moment; one 
does not have to wait for the credits to make sense of the experience. Similarly, a player-
subject generally creates a narrative of her own before acting in game space. To 
summarise, the concept of narrativizing includes both the sequential and the causal 
dimensions of narrative in addition to the act of interpreting sign-vehicles at hand. 
 
 
2.4. Instant Replay 
 
Now that we are finally ready to make the transition to electronic games, the fact that all 
that has been discussed thus far applies also in the second part of the thesis must be 
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emphasised again. Electronic games are admittedly typically designed and thus more 
authored to be played than a random non-electronic one, but they still need the player-
subject to experience them in order to create a real gaming situation. This means that 
even if the screen separates the player-subject from the game world, the ludic space 
extends to include the one acting on the other side. After our discussion on narratives, 
however, the list of common elements of games presented in section ‘Formality | 
Gameness’ can now be updated: 
 
1) to play a game is to experience doing so (and usually also being aware of it) 
2) the experience of play typically takes precedence over endogenous narratives 
3) games consist of rules, which separate the experience spatially from non-game spaces 
4) the interface of the game and its endogenous goals are also demarcated by its rules 
5) player-subjects must have ludic motivation to reach goals within game space 
6) games’ initial state is the starting point for subsequent events and states 
7) the acts of player-subjects and other events in both game space and game place form 
game states in relation to the rules 
8) players narrativize the sequence of game states to reach the aforementioned goals 
9) events in game space can be narrativized by audiences to form distinct narrative spaces 
 
The latter part of the thesis will include discussion on topics like interface, theme and 
simulation with multiple examples concentrating on electronic games. We will also take a 
closer look at the explicit narrative properties of game spaces, in other words, we will see 
how endogenous narratives are created in electronic environments. To end the first part of 
the thesis, a lengthy quote from Ryan will be provided. Her thoughts bring forward many 
elements that will be looked into later in the thesis. Ryan’s proposal is very exciting in 
itself, as the new “phenomenological category” would in a way mean accepting narrative 
potential as part of the narrative itself. This will be an essential feature of the discussion 




Are we then entitled to say that a computer game is, or can be a narrative? […] 
The inability of literary narratology to account for the experience of games does 
not mean that we should throw away the concept of narrative in ludology; it rather 
means that we need to expand the catalog of narrative modalities beyond the 
diegetic and the dramatic, by adding a phenomenological category tailor-made for 
games. In elaborating this category, we can take a clue from the relation between 
the diegetic and the mimetic mode. What justifies us in calling movies and drama 
narrative is the shape of the mental representation formed in the mind of the 
spectator; if this spectator were to translate his mental image into language, he 
would produce an act of narration – a diegetically presented narrative. A dramatic 
narrative is thus a virtual, or potential diegetic one. With games we can extend 
virtuality one step further. The player perform[s] actions which, were he to reflect 
upon them, would form a dramatic plot – though this plot is not normally his 
focus of attention during the heat of the action. Games thus embody a virtualized, 
or potential dramatic narrativity, which itself hinges on the virtual diegetic 
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3. Nature of Electronic Games – From Screen to 
Simulated Narrative 
 
The previous chapter having discussed games in general, we are now finally ready to 
make the transition to electronic games. With the change in focus the common realisation 
of the role of a game as an object, a product, something that is often more clearly defined, 
becomes inevitably stronger. Now, the box is on the table, the disc is in the drive and the 
image is on the screen. Naturally, all the aspects of gaming previously discussed still 
apply. The ludic space is created between the screen and the player-subject, the screen 
containing the game place exclusively. The gaming experience concentrates wholly onto 
the screen; its contents having been put there by the author. Consequently, the source and 
the mode of representation typically give the ludic space more formality than is the case 
with many other kinds of games. The features touched upon in the next section provide a 
common framework for all electronic games without compromising the theorems 
presented in the previous chapter. 
 
 
3.1. Reverse Angle 
 
The chapter opens with a quick recapitulation applying the notions formed thus far to an 
electronic environment while some of the most important concepts of gaming that have 
been discovered are rounded up at the same time. As in all other games, rules are the 
most quintessential feature of electronic games. With electronic games in particular, rules 
can easily be divided into two categories: those that concern the interface and those that 
concern the game place. It comes as no surprise that the rules of an electronic game 
cannot extend beyond the screen and the appropriate means of operating the interface. 
Thus, the behaviour of the player-subject in the game space itself is freer from 
restrictions imposed by the rule set, but she is still more bound to the interface in regard 
to acting in the ludic place. 
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As stated, the game space is constructed through the experience of the rules of the game, 
still encompassing the player-subject and the virtual place, connected with each other 
through the interface.184 Ludic space manifests itself to the player-subject via semiotic 
processes that combine the characteristics of both textual and semiological sign systems. 
The space contains the game place, as a clear representation of an actual location or a 
more abstract site. The interface decides the level of agency the player-subject has within 
the game world. The ludic space formed by an electronic game also requires ludic 
motivation like any other game. Thus if an event sequence in Half-Life is happening on 
the screen, but the subject is merely looking for a good screenshot for a school art project, 
a game space is not being, at least consistently, constituted. 
 
In regard to electronic games, events, like rules, can be easily divided into those that 
occur in game place and those that have to do with operating the interface. Other player-
subjects are rarely factors in events outside the game world, but exceptions like LAN-
parties185 exist, where meaningful events not relating to the player-subject herself can 
occur in the game space itself. Narrativization of events by the audience can be divided 
into two categories in relation to electronic games: the audience may be in the same 
actual space as the player-subject (all events in game space are narrativized) or the 
audience may not in the same actual space as the player-subject (only the events in game 
place are narrativized).  
 
However, the sequence of states in an electronic game is a feature solely connected with 
the game place and the interface. In the sections to follow, we will examine the ways in 
which the state sequence is mixed with the narrative structures within the game space. In 
any case, the narrativization of states is typically more explicit in electronic games, 
because the game world is always limited exclusively to the screen. 
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3.2. Screen – Theme 
 
Screen | Immersion 
 
For our purposes, an electronic game is defined as a game whose ludic place is 
manifested through a screen. This characteristic is also one of the many reasons why 
they are sometimes regarded as a distinct medium on their own. As previously discussed, 
however, the transition from a non-electronic game to an electronic one is not a major 
one. The most important difference is that in electronic games, rules are automatically 
upheld,186 which naturally applies also to causal relations that are beyond the scope of 
player-subject’s observational capabilities.187 This results in a more important role for the 
interface, which both enables and demarcates the gaming experience in an electronic 
environment.188 While rules are always embodied by different elements in each game,189 
with electronic games, this representation is much more explicit. The ludic place of an 
electronic game is a more prominent element of the space it is a part of, since the place 
always falls wholly under the dominion of the system of rules. Because of their highly 
virtual game worlds, their rules have to be mediated through themes, which are looked 
into later in this chapter. Mediation also becomes essential in another way, as the 
interface of an electronic game always acts as a mediating factor in a ludic experience. 
 
With the highly virtual place only accessible via a flat surface comes the realisation that 
the player-subject is no longer wholly surrounded by the game space, as often is the case 
with less virtual ludic places with fellow players participating in the same ludic space 
staying physically close by. Although this “plastic”190 screen is not perceived by the 
player-subject as a spatially limiting factor in itself, it still adds to the fickleness of the 
gaming experience, since it makes it more difficult to stay in game space without being 
constantly reminded of the artificial nature of the experience, or even distracted by real 
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world events. As a consequence in the case of electronic games, there exists a constant 
requirement for projecting an “active […] consciousness into the semantic realm”191 in 
question. Poole describes this process as something contributing to “the dissolution of 
self-consciousness”.192 The already mentioned quote from Murray involving water 
describes this dissolution in the following way: 
 
The experience of being transported to an elaborately simulated place is 
pleasurable in itself, regardless of the fantasy content. We refer to this experience 
as immersion. Immersion is a metaphorical term derived from the physical 
experience of being submerged in water. We seek the same feeling from a 
psychological immersive experience that we do from a plunge in the ocean or 
swimming pool: the sensation of being surrounded by a completely other reality, 
as different as water is from air, that takes over all of our attention, our whole 
perceptual apparatus.193
 
By grasping the attention of the player-subject, immersive qualities strengthen the ludic 
motivation, simultaneously adding to the pleasure of gaming.194 “The sense of immersion 
[…] creates in the gamer an acute awareness of space”,195 which also contributes to the 
immediacy of the experience. The relationship the feeling of immersion has to the game 
space is that immersion consummates the virtuality of the said space by underpinning the 
ludic perspective in reference to which it is produced in the first place. However, because 
of the fragility of “the liminal trance”196 typical for a gaming experience, additional 
modes of its support are used in electronic games, not the least of which is the common 
introduction of explicit narrative content, which plays an important part in the theoretical 
framework of the chapter. These endogenous narratives are specifically looked at in 
connection to role-playing games later in the chapter, but meanwhile, let us now look at 
two other important elements of an immersive ludic experience, namely interface and 
agency. 
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Interface | Agency 
 
Although both are producers of immersion, interface and agency are not mutually 
comparable. While the interface is clearly a part of the rule set of a game space, agency 
can be paralleled with immersion as a constituent of the gaming experience. While 
immersion, in a way, crowns the virtual aspects of gaming as opposed to reality, agency 
“is the satisfying power to take meaningful action”197 within that virtual. In other words, 
it can be seen as “an experience to be savored for its own sake”198 as well as the 
perspective utilised when acting via the interface of the game. 
 
On the other hand, interface is the “medium”199 through which the game place is 
accessible from the point of perception of the player-subject in the game space. In other 
words, the interface gives the player-subject the tools to act in the game world, and thus 
also to affect the event and state sequences. The system created by the combination of the 
world and the interface can be called the ludic environment, which is usually game-
specific.200 A well-designed interface enables practically immediate acts in the game 
world, which makes the border between the ludic space and the ludic place within it less 
explicit, thus strengthening the feeling of agency, which is, in the case of electronic 
games, wholly dependent on the screen. 
 
In game journalism the phenomenon described above is referred to with the term 
‘playability’, which can be, and often is, held to be the most important aspect of a good 
game.201 Good playability, combined with explicit narrative content emphasises the 
narrative aspect of gaming, because qualities improving playability result in the acts of 
gaming itself losing some of their meaning in favour of meaningful acts within the game 
world. To put it differently, the actions of a player-subject feel, relatively speaking, more 
significant in regard to the game world, if there exists a strong narrative content to 
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contextualise the said world. The paradoxical thing about all this in terms of ludology is 
the previously mentioned fact that being less aware of the act of gaming itself, in other 
words operating the interface, typically enhances the ludic experience, which often puts 
the limelight on the narrative aspects of the game.202
 
Hence, if the interface is well-designed and thus relatively invisible, the experience of 
being immersed in the game world becomes stronger. According to Murray, agency and 
immersion can both be considered as sources of pleasure in a ludic experience,203 which 
naturally strengthens ludic motivation. Murray also brings forward the difference 
between “agency” and “activity” using Chess as an example: despite the major effect the 
player-subjects have on the events of a match, physically they hardly do anything.204 In 
Baldur’s Gate, the division is as easy to see; the player-subject, if so willing, can 
programme the characters in the party she is controlling to act on their own according to 
pre-prepared scripts, thus drastically reducing her activity while still preserving her 
agency to a much greater degree. 
 
As we can see, activity is clearly located on the level of the game space, while agency has 
only to do with the game world in question. In other words, agency is concerned with 
how, through the interface, the state sequence of a game is being affected by the player-
subject. Both the audience narrativizing the game space with its events, as well as the 
player-subject primarily narrativizing the game place with its states, become more 
explicit phenomena through Murray’s division between activity and agency. 
 
With electronic games, the virtuality of the ludic place resembles something that Jukka 
Sihvonen calls the “hyper-real”, where the space is increasingly controlled by its 
interfacial dimension; this results in both the potentiality and the congruence of the 
spatial on screen losing its temporal dimensionality.205 This also makes the game state a 
much more tangible concept, a point which is clearly illustrated by the pause button 
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found in many electronic games. The pause button, of course, is always a part of the 
interface of a game, which, in turn, is a part of its rules. Consequently, the elements of 
interface constitute some of the formality of how the rules are manifested in game space; 
the rest is provided by the theme. 
 
 
Representation | Theme 
 
Even the most abstract of electronic games can be seen as representations and/or 
simulations of something.206 Typically in the context of game studies, representation 
and/or simulation is taken to mean something very real, like war (Medal of Honor) or car 
racing (Gran Turismo), but there is absolutely no reason why Tetris could not be seen 
featuring a silo filling up with blocks. In other words, what seems to be fundamentally 
represented in every case is the place, or the “space” in Aarseth’s terms, which he argues 
to be “[t]he defining element in computer games”,207 since “the difference between the 
spatial representation and real space is what makes gameplay by automatic rules 
possible.”208 As was discussed in the previous chapter, this is the connection between not 
just rules and place but also rules and space: in game space the rules, and the goals made 
possible by the rules, are an intrinsic part of the space, a part of how the space functions, 
a part of what the space is. 
 
According to Aarseth, spatial practice in electronic games has a double-sided nature in 
that its modes can be looked at both as “representations of space” as well as 
“representational spaces”.209 The former posits ‘space’, or in this text, ‘place’, as “a 
formal system of relations” and the latter as “symbolic imagery with a primarily aesthetic 
purpose”.210 The division is useful to note but quite impossible to uphold in absolute 
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terms, as the formal and the aesthetic are not completely separable from each other for 
reasons discussed in the following. 
 
In regard to the Aarseth’s division, however, we would like to borrow a highly useful 
concept of theme from game scholar Aki Järvinen. Järvinen defines ‘theme’ as “the 
subject matter or the narrative framing of the game […] used in contextualizing the 
ruleset into other meanings than the rules’ literal, i.e. systemic meaning.”211 In other 
words, theme refers to the endogenous narrative (and other)212 constructions that 
sugarcoat the system of rules into a more appropriate, or even better, a more meaningful 
form; themes bring forward and add to the functional, primary meanings residing within 
the rule set, which have been the focus of the thesis from the beginning. Thus we see how 
the concept of theme extends both to the systemic and the representational aspects of 
game place outlined by Aarseth, while still maintaining its role as part of the rule system 
of the game.  
 
Also discussed above is the de rigueur paralleling of rules and space. As with the child 
suddenly starting to play a game of “Squirrel about to be picked up by mum” (a game of 
his own invention, by the way) without even telling his friends about it, the existence of 
the ludic space and its rules is absolutely co-dependent by nature. What makes it a 
particularly interesting phenomenon is how Murray equates story with place by 
describing playing Zork. 
 
The computer screen is displaying a story that is also a place. The slamming of a 
dungeon door behind you (whether the dungeon is described by words or images) 
is a moment of experiential drama that is only possible in a digital 
environment.213
 
In the context of this thesis, Murray’s argument is intriguing for multiple reasons. Firstly, 
she makes a connection between ludic experience and the narrative constructions 
originating from sequences of events and states. Secondly, she draws an obvious parallel 
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between narrative and place, which, as previously mentioned, plays a more significant 
role as a component of space in the case of electronic games.  
 
Consequently, combining all the previous approaches presented in this section results in a 
situation in which both rules and space have been more or less mushed into equality with 
narrative. To demonstrate the fruitfulness in this slightly forced state of affairs, let us take 
an example from the beginning of Baldur’s Gate. The role-playing game in question 
begins in Candlekeep, a small scholarly town where the avatar of the player-subject has 
been allegedly raised to fulfil a great destiny. Before leaving town, the avatar is met by a 
character named Jondalar, who teaches the player-subject how to fight. By doing so, 
Jondalar partly exits the realm of the game world by referring to the game space in 
general and specifically to the interface.214
 
Jondalar: Hey there [avatar’s name]! I see you’re up early this day. Well your 
father, Gorion, has asked me a strange favor. Seems like he wants you to learn 
some fighting and asked me to be the teacher. So I hope you brought your staff 
with you. 
  
Jondalar: Hostile creatures have red circles around their feet. Left-clicking 
within the circle will direct you to attack me. You can switch weapons by using 
the Quick Weapons icons. The weapon outlined in green is the current weapon. 
Attack with fists only (empty quick slot) if you only wish to knock your opponent 
unconscious. You don’t have to worry about that with me, so use your staff. If 
you have magical abilities, try casting a spell at me by left clicking on the spell 
icon at the bottom of the screen. Left-click on one of the spells that come up and 
cast it on whichever target you want. I just hope you have an offensive spell 
memorized. 
  
Jondalar: During our fight I’m going to spring a little surprise on you. Remember, 
you can press the SPACE BAR at any time and pause the game. This will give 
you time to think, especially once my little surprise comes up. Are you ready now? 
Good!215
 
                                                 
214 Some of the quotes taken from the exemplary games used in the thesis are quite lengthy for two 
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Note how Jondalar first acts like any character in the game world, but quickly starts to 
address the player-subject instead. Nearing the end of the dialogue (during which the 
player-subject has nothing to say) Jondalar’s lines transform back to being wholly 
appropriate for a representation of a purely endogenous character. 
 
What is really going on here is that the player-subject receives instructions about the rules 
of the game space via the endogenous narrative, which in turn is a part of the theme of 
the game. A similar phenomenon can be seen in the beginning of Neverwinter Nights as 
in many other games as well, especially role-playing games. This intertwining does 
destroy immersion to a certain degree, but on the other hand, it strengthens the feeling of 
agency in a situation still not far from the game’s initial state, when the player-subject is 
usually in need of a little help to get immersed in the game world in the first place. 
 
Generally speaking, the interrelationships of rules, theme and narrative are at their most 
explicit in the participatory dialogue taking place in a given game world. This is because 
participatory dialogue always occurs during the gaming itself and not, for instance, in a 
cut-scene. The dialogue is always part of the endogenous narrative, while still being 
controlled by the rules through the game’s theme, in which the narrative content is 
included. Jondalar is an extreme example of this. 
 
Let us summarise the argument at this point. What is really represented by the theme of a 
game is its rules; exactly how specifically the rules of a given game are forged to parallel 
something ‘real’ is a different matter. As Järvinen points out, “rules are ‘disguised’ into 
thematic meaning”,216 which is fundamentally less significant than the primary meaning 
relating to the rule set. Examples for the secondary nature of thematic meaning are 
extremely easy to find in any game. In the first chapter of Betrayal at Krondor, the 
avatars are in a hurry to get to the city of Krondor; however, the player-subject is 
completely free to roam the world as long as she wants without any ill effects. In 
Baldur’s Gate, the avatar and her party can ‘jump’ in an instant from an area of the game 
world to another without having to be walked around manually the whole way, but they 
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can still be ambushed en route: if an encounter with enemies is brought on by the rules, 
no act in the thematised ludic place can prevent it. These examples also emphasise the 
significance of spatiality of a ludic experience compared to its temporal dimension. 
 
As we have seen with electronic games, the game place itself has qualities distinctive for 
narrative, because the theme represents them both. Consequently, the relationship 
between the rules of the game and its endogenous narrative is revealed: the theme is the 
representing part of the rules of the game and the endogenous narrative within the theme 
is thus an integral part of the rules as well. Also exposed is how the complexity of the 
rules in regard to game places and endogenous narratives affects the level of 
thematisation needed. For example, in Chess, the theme can easily be changed from Star 
Wars to The Lord of the Rings without hardly any interference to the game mechanics. 
On the other hand, relocating a combat-oriented role-playing game from mediaeval 
Europe to faraway future on Mars would probably mean favouring, for instance, long-
distance weapons over hand-to-hand combat, which would likely result in changes in the 
rule set of the game itself. To see how theme’s representation of rules relates to the non-
ludic outside the game space, however, we have to take up the concept of simulation. 
 
 
3.3. Simulation – Simulated Narrative 
 
Simulation | Automaticity 
 
“[A] simulation imitates one process by another process.”217 This makes a simulation a 
dynamic mode of representation; in other words, to simulate is to dynamically represent a 
system through another system. Much like stated above in regard to representations in 
general, simulation can be considered a process that is applicable to any electronic 
game.218 On the other hand even SimCity, which is seen by some almost as a non-game 
because of its strong simulation-like qualities combined with its relative lack of clear 
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goals, is still widely criticised for its elements that have no real base outside the game, for 
instance its economic model.219 As with any representation, the relationship between the 
simulation and what is being simulated is clearly subject to interpretation. 
 
Salen and Zimmerman bring forward the procedural nature of simulation by dividing the 
layers of simulation into two categories, which are “procedural representation” and “the 
relationship of those representations to the world outside the game.”220 Procedural 
representation refers exclusively to how the game system, in other words the rule set, is 
manifested by its theme; these processes are strictly limited to a given game space. On 
the other hand, it is in the nature of simulation that it can always be traced back to a 
process outside the game space,221 even if it can never “depict every aspect of 
something”.222 In the ludic context, a simulation equals a simultaneous representation of 
both the rules and a given process or processes outside the game space, both of which are 
also made possible by the game’s theme. In addition to this double-layered structure, the 
dynamic nature of simulation stems from the automaticity of rules inherent to all 
electronic games. 
 
Another point of view is brought to the discussion by Frasca, who states that simulating 
refers to “the modelling of a dynamic system through another system”223 while also 
maintaining something of the original system for “somebody”.224 Here, the subject of a 
simulation is also taken into account in a larger degree, which emphasises the dynamic 
nature of the meaning-making processes in this context.225 As stated above, a simulation 
is experienced by the player-subject in two simultaneous ways: as an internal rule system 
in the game space and as an external process represented dynamically as such, but 
referring to something outside it. 
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In the context of this thesis, theme, being a part of the rule system as its manifestation, 
represents rules which are formed to simulate something outside the game space, the 
‘reality’, if you will. The primacy of rules in game space applies to the twofold nature of 
the theme and the simulation it enables as well. The representation of rules becomes more 
explicit in relation to Frasca’s noteworthy way of presenting his thoughts on simulation 
specifically as an alternative approach to games as opposed to narrative.226 However, the 
primacy of rules covers also the endogenous narrative. 
 
 
Endogenicity | Synthesis 
 
The significance of explicit narrative elements varies according to genre, of which role-
playing games227 constitute the most important genre in this respect.228 That is why they 
are examined in connection with deepening our understanding of endogenous narratives 
and their relationships to simulations. The genre is notoriously hard to define even in 
regard to electronic games as “[r]ole-playing elements are creeping crabwise into any 
number of other genres, as a way of bolting on a framework of narrative drive to the old 
repetitive game style.”229 This is one of the reasons why electronic game genres should 
be considered more inclusive than exclusive by nature230 and also why a clear-cut 
definition of an RPG is not only hard but rather pointless to attempt. 
 
“Typically [electronic role-playing] games include an emphasis on character generation 
and evolution, storytelling, exploration, team play and turn based combat systems.”231 
For our purposes, RPGs are interesting for a number of reasons: they usually have 
substantial endogenous narratives, a lot of dialogue and a ludic place that can often really 
be called a ‘world’. While signs in ludic spaces can be both linguistic and semiological 
by nature, RPGs typically contain a relatively large number of purely linguistic signs, 
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which makes them quite textual as games. This means that they provide good examples 
when discussing narratives and their connection to the rule systems in ludic spaces. 
It is also useful to keep in mind that the explicitness the genre in question features does 
not mean that endogenous narratives are relatively rare phenomena; on the contrary, it is 
sometimes difficult to even find electronic games with absolutely no endogenous 
narrative of any kind outside the simplest games like Tetris. 
 
Betrayal at Krondor is a classic role-playing game, whose endogenous narrative is 
presented in a book-like form; it is not based on a book, but its story is a new component 
in a series of novels by Raymond E. Feist. Feist also co-wrote the narrative for the 
game.232 The game takes place in the fantasy world of Midkemia and is divided into nine 
chapters. Its narrative begins with a young man tending another man’s wounds at a 
campsite after a skirmish with an unknown enemy. In what follows are the first lines of 
Chapter 1: Into a Dark Night and consequently the first lines of the endogenous 
narrative,233 which in this case, like in many others, begins before the initial state234 of 
the game space.235 This is a noteworthy element as it emphasises the blending of 
narrative and game space, to which we will return later in this section. The three main 
characters in the following quote, Locklear, Owyn and Gorath, act as the player-subject’s 
avatars in the first chapter of the game. 
 
Blood soaked rags collected at the boy’s feet. 
 
One by one he tended the wincing soldier's purple wounds, stitched, salved, 
bandaged, did what little he could in the leaping golden halo of firelight. 
Fortunately for his roadside patient, he could do more than most. 
 
Fingers slick with alum ointment, he worked fervently to tie off a catgut cord, 
then brushed the injury with a light touch that to the untrained eye would seem 
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only a friendly pat – others would recognize the telltale hand gesture as a magical 
ward against infection. 
 
"Done," Owyn sighed, wiping his hand in a rust colored cloth. "No guarantees, 
though. The stitches may hold all the way to LaMut and then again, push too hard 
and you could be bleeding like a stuck pig on Midsummers…" 
 
"You did – fine," Seigneur Locklear replied, smiling approval before rolling down 
his sleeve. "It'll scar but it's good for a noble's reputation. Lets the kingdom folk 
know he isn't resting on his laurels and it impresses the ladies. I'll be sure to look 
you up in Tiburn if ever I need stitching up again." 
 
The boy accepted the compliment with a humble nod while he packaged away the 
rest of his medical supplies, his thoughts focused instead on a third man who 
slumped in the shadows across from them. Despite the manacles that bound the 
stranger's hands and the distance that separated them, the boy felt dreadfully 
exposed, his avenues of escape limited should Locklear's elven-looking prisoner 
decide to liberate himself. 
 
"What did he do?" Owyn whispered, jerking his head towards the man. 
 
"Gorath? Let's just say that he had the disadvantage of being at the wrong place at 
the wrong time," Locklear said cautiously. He snatched a greenish apple out of his 
knapsack, offering one to Owyn. "I have to take him to Krondor." 
 




"He attacked you." 
 
The Seigneur wiped apple juice from his mouth, shook his head. "No, no, not 
exactly." 
 
"Well, who cut you up then?" 
 




...Gorath leapt forward, his chains writhing between his wrists like metallic vipers. 
 
GORATH: Get out from underfoot, Owyn! Assassin in the camp! 
 
[---] 
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GORATH: Do not struggle so, Haseth. I wish to keep you alive. 
 
GORATH: But be glad I do not. The goddess of death will show you greater 
mercy. 237
 
Most of the text is presented by itself, but the struggle between Gorath and Haseth is 
accompanied with an animation. The following screen after that is already an in-game 
one and also the initial state of the actual game space. Thus we see how the narrative 
begins as a text with its own narrative space, transitioning first into a film and finally into 
the game itself. As noted above, the transition results in the synthesis of the narrative and 
the ludic spaces. 
 
In accordance with what we see from the example above, endogenous narratives contain 
events that take place in the game world, like the conversation between Locklear and 
Owyn. These events originating from its endogenous narrative should be considered to be 
affiliated with the sequence of events occurring in the ludic space, even though they do 
occur in the same immediate way as the actual event sequence structuring the game space. 
To put it differently, they affect the narrativization process of the player-subject without 
affecting the state sequence. Consequently, events in an endogenous narrative create a 
partly separate narrative space within the game space. 
 
However, the definition of the endogenous narrative enables it to escape the fate of a  
“backstory”, which typically gets badly trampled on by the gaming experience.238 In the 
example below, the player-subject has just clicked on a certain hot spot on the landscape 
painting representing the city of Highcastle and its surroundings. The clicking results in 
the party of avatars supposedly entering a pass in the mountains near the city. 
 
Rain slanted out of the sky. 
 
Squiffing through the muddy pass, Locklear stared miserably at the broken 
remnants of a bridge which had once spanned Highcastle Gorge. Blinking rain out 
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of his eyes, he looked to Gorath. "The bridge has been sabotaged," he spat. "Three 
days of this back to Highcastle unless you have any other ideas." 
 
Gorath scowled and shook his head. "I don't know what would be gained by 
turning back into the Northlands. I think it just as well the way is blocked." 
 
"I have my reasons," Locklear shot back, angry that the trip had been a waste of 
time. "Let's head back to Highcastle."239
 
Locklear’s comment about his “reasons” is a good example of the way endogenous 
narrative works outside the state structure of the ludic space. The tension the sharp 
remark brings to the gaming experience is purely narrative by nature: did Locklear in fact 
have a reason to go that way or is he just disappointed in the pointlessness of the journey? 
The question is never answered in any form, but clicking the hot spot actually still 
removes the appropriate amount of rations from the avatars’ inventories. However, 
leaving the comment out altogether from the narrative would not have mattered in regard 
to the primary ludic meaning of losing resources. 
 
Thus we see how endogenous narrative brings a whole new layer to the gaming 
experience and adds to its immersive qualities. Betrayal at Krondor features the elements 
in abundance: when an avatar gets poisoned during a battle, the information concerning 
the event is conveyed to the player-subject via a narrative construction. 
 
Owyn was on fire. 
 
His insides burned like hot coals in a farrier's pot, this in sharp contrast to the 
numbness he felt in his mouth and lips. The poison that had spread through his 
system was slowly sapping his strength, draining him of everything but his will to 
survive.240
 
As far primary meanings go, the description is redundant; it could have easily been 
displaced, for instance, by changing the colour of one of Owyn’s health statistics from 
black to green. In regard to the simulating aspect of electronic gaming, neither way can 
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really be seen as more appropriate one, since neither expands their representative 
elements to involve the ludic place itself; Owyn, weakened by the poison, does not 
visibly stagger or delay the journey. In both cases, as per the general principles of a ludic 
space, the primary referent of the theme’s simulation is rules, not representing something 
outside the game space. The synthesis of the narrative space, in the form of the 
endogenous narrative, and the ludic space is evident. 
 
At this point in the text, at least as far as the scope of this thesis is concerned, the case in 
regard to the nature of games themselves is, in essence, closed. In the theoretical 
framework in question, the rule set forms goals which the player-subjects struggles to 
achieve through the process of narrativization, which involves the player-subject 
interpreting the sequence of states in any game space. The space itself is held together 
with the help of its immersive qualities combined with the player-subject’s ludic 
motivation arising from her feeling of agency. But in relation to narratives, one 




| Simulated Narrative | 
 
As previously stated, while endogenous narratives contain events that take place in its 
ludic place, they do not affect the state sequence. On the other hand, the agency of a 
player-subject creates events through an interface, which result in events in a ludic place; 
these events do change the state of the game. In a non-ludic context, these two 
phenomena can be paralleled with the sense-making process involving narrativizing both 
a subjective experience on the one hand (sequence of states) and appreciating stories on 
the other (endogenous narrative).241 These two processes are also both mediated by the 
theme of the game, a fact that that ties them both to the rules and goals that guide 
interpretation. Additionally, the synthesis of the two different kinds of spaces gives birth 
to what we like to call a ‘simulated narrative’. 
                                                 
241 Anderson, Joseph D. (1996, 144-5). 
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In a game space, narratives are never free for interpretation for two interconnected 
reasons discussed above. The narrative constructions are always bound by the rules, 
which tie them up with the narrativization process of the state sequence inherent in every 
ludic experience. On the other hand, the endogenous narrative is a part of the theme 
representing the rules. Because the player-subject narrativizes only the sequence of states, 
the endogenous narrative is not narrativized as a part of the game space, since it never 
changes the state of the game in itself. However, when the state sequence is narrativized 
by the player-subject, a simulated narrative is created in reference to the endogenous 
narrative structure. This process can be opposed to the event sequence being narrativized 
by the members of an audience, when narrative remains non-simulated because of their 
lack of agency in the ludic space in question.  
 
Player-subjects, however, do possess agency in ludic space. The exception to that rule is 
the situation when the event sequence in the game world progresses automatically 
without any input from the player-subject. These situations interrupt the state sequence, 
but they do not interrupt the feeling of immersion; the ludic motivation of the player-
subject remains intact and so does the awareness of the rules and goals. The game space 
is phased out only partially, the narrative being represented through the game. Combined 
with the player-subject’s agency, the endogenous becomes a part of the simulated, thus 
combining the state sequence with the event sequence of the game world. 
 
Although constantly interrupted by gaming, the narrative space still remains consistent 
both in relation to its parts as well as in regard to what occurs between them. In the first 
chapter of Betrayal at Krondor, the party of three avatars controlled by the player-subject 
(Locklear, Owyn and Gorath) make their way from the campsite, described in the above 
example, to the city of Krondor. When they reach the royal palace within the city through 
the sewers, the player-subject is greeted with another piece of endogenous narrative. The 
following acts as the narrative that ends the first chapter of the game. 
 
The gate swung open. 
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Revolted by the thick scent of excrement in the chamber, Locklear hastened to the 
ladder affixed on the far wall and ascended its filth slick rungs. Behind him, 
Gorath and Owyn reluctantly did likewise, gaffing on the noxious vapors in the 
shaft. 
 
"This is nothing," Locklear grunted, shoving upwards against a grating. "All the 
windows in the palace are open right now. You ought to smell it in the winter." 
 
Darkness surrounded them as they slithered out of the privy, their only 
impressions of the chamber provided by the faint flicker of distant firelight. Ten 
yards before them the hall joined with an elaborate colonnade stretching in either 
direction. 
 
"Somehow I hadn't pictured my first visit to Krondor like this," Owyn sighed, 
falling blindly into step behind Gorath and the Seigneur. 
 
"What, you didn't like the romantic tour?" Locklear chuckled. "Not many people 
get to see that way into the palace." 
 
Drawing up short, Locklear's features brightened as he observed a pair of 
approaching figures lost in conversation. Self-conscious of his bedraggled 
condition he straightened his uniform and cleared his throat with a stentorian air: 
 




ARUTHA: As glad as I am at the sight of you safely home again, Locklear, I can't 
say that my nose is as well pleased. I thought we had broken you and Seigneur 




LOCKLEAR: You know the way of old habits, highness. We encountered a bit of 
trouble with the gates and so I chose a more expedient though somewhat more 
disagreeable path. It came to a happy end, however. James told us to send word 




ARUTHA: Incurable sewer rats, the both of you. I shall have to order that each of 
you be accompanied by a score of washing maidens to keep you presentable 
enough for court. Welcome home, Locky. 
 
[…] 
                                                 
242 Transition to accompanied graphics. 
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LOCKLEAR: Thank you. As happy as I am to be here, I'm afraid I come with bad 




ARUTHA: I expected as much. With the false Nighthawks prowling my streets 
above and below it can only mean the moredhel are up to their old mischief. What 




Motioning to Gorath, Locklear introduced the former moredhel chieftain with a 
wave. Slowly, Gorath lowered his hood. The gasps and startled reactions of those 
crowding the hall helped mask the stealthy entrance of a second moredhel in the 




PUG: Assassin! Get Down!243
 
The real nature of narrative in the ludic space is the relationship that this and the former 
quote taking place at the campsite have with the gaming that happened in between. The 
party travels the distance between the two pieces of endogenous narrative through the 
player-subject’s agency. In the game world, the event sequence is formed starting with 
the ambush at the campsite and ending with the second ambush at the royal palace. The 
state sequence, on the other hand, is formed beginning only after the ambush and ending 
before the party opens the gate to the palace. Without the narrative space around them, 
the events and states between the two ambushes would be narrativized in a different 
manner; the narrative space within the game space, a narrative construction represented 
in terms of the game system, affects the way the game is interpreted. 
 
From a strictly ludological point of view, it may seem an overstatement to maintain that 
the narrative space guides interpretation in the game space itself. However, the 
endogenous narrative acts as a priming factor in structuring the context, which takes 
place in connection to “sequencing a string of phenomena”.244 In other words, the player-
subject, while narrativizing the game space, focuses more on something that has been 
                                                 
243 Dynamix (1993). 
244 Grodal, Torben Kragh (1994, 66). 
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framed as significant by the narrative space within it. We also have to keep in mind the 
Eisensteinian idea that the story forms in the subject’s mind, not on the screen.245 From 
square one onwards, the game space is fundamentally a subjective creation, even if the 
endogenous narrative is created flexible enough to make it impossible for subjective 
agency to render it inappropriate: an example of this can be seen in the way Jondalar’s 
first line starts with the name of the player-subject’s avatar, what ever it is. Again, we see 
how the rules of the game control the endogenicity within the space. 
 
To illustrate the nature of simulated narrative as opposed to a non-simulated one, let us 
take an example from Chatman. He makes a distinction between kernels, “narrative 
moments that give rise to cruxes in the direction taken by events” and satellites, whose 
“function is that of filling in, elaborating, completing the kernel; they form the flesh of 
the skeleton.”246 Often in games with lots of endogenous narrative in the form of cut-
scenes, for instance, they can be considered as the skeleton of kernels, the agency of the 
player-subject in between filling them with flesh. However, Chatman describes kernels as 
instances of having a choice of “branching points”, while satellites “entail no choice, but 
are solely the workings-out of the choices made at the kernels.”247 In games, the situation 
is the opposite: cut-scenes and the like offer no chances to affect the story, but the 
satellites in between offer the only choices available. 
 
Thus we understand how the simulated narrative works in a different way from a non-
simulated narrative because of its twofold nature; it is easy to see why some game 
scholars see gaming as an anti-narrative phenomenon. Admittedly, the kernels of a 
simulated narrative do not have to be points in the endogenous narrative, but even the 
agency of a player-subject is still heavily limited by the predestined fabric of the state 
sequence largely predetermined by the rules. These narrative points are manifested as 
something that can be presumed to be appropriate for a walkthrough formulated on the 
basis of a given game. 
 
                                                 
245 Bordwell, David (1990, 14). 
246 Chatman, Seymour (1993, 53-4). 
247 Ibid. 
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As stated above, to simulate is to dynamically represent a system through another system. 
Through the synthesis of the ludic and the narrative space, the rule system of the game, 
manifested by the theme, is able to dynamically represent a narrative, which encompasses 
both its endogenous dimension and the elements over which the player-subjects have 
agency. Thus games with endogenous narratives feature a blending of the game and the 
narrative spaces, which means that an inherently narrative content is conveyed through a 
ludic system. Consequently, the narrativized elements intertwine with the explicit 



























What have we decided? That underneath the flashy graphics, cinematic cut-scenes, 
real-time physics, mythological back stories and everything else, a videogame at 
bottom is still a highly artificial, purposely designed semiotic engine. And its 
purpose is not to simulate real life, but to offer the gift of playing a game. When 
we are at play, whether in front of a videogame screen, in a chess café, at the 
bowling alley or in the park, we are citizens of an invisible city, built of signs.248
 
Here, Poole underlines the virtuality of gaming, which has been strongly emphasised 
throughout the thesis. In regard to games in general, the virtuality is in no way mediated 
in itself, making immediacy an inherent quality of any gaming experience. In this light, 
despite the virtuality of the game world, considering electronic games as a medium is 
highly suspect. 
 
Games are extremely hard to define. Reasons for this are manifold, but it does not make 
the search for a clear definition any easier that gaming is an activity which is able to 
transform meanings via the perspective the ludic experience presupposes. Like Aarseth 
describes “cybertexts” as perspectives for textuality,249 gaming can be seen as a 
perspective for playing. Murray even goes as far as to calling games “structured 
activities”,250 which makes games’ position as actual objects even more faltering. 
 
This thesis presents games in a similar fashion, more like vehicles for a ludic experience 
than has been traditional in game studies. Perhaps there are no ‘games’ as such, but only 
constructions designed to appease the human need to play in certain way? After all, the 
author of rules can be anyone, anywhere, anytime. The answer to the question and 
whether it is even a reasonable one in the first place is naturally a matter of perspective in 
itself. Be that as it may, it seems that after almost a lifetime ago when the author died and 
the reader was born,251 the reader has now been possessed by the ghost of the author. 
 
                                                 
248 Poole, Stephen (2007, 349-50). 
249 Aarseth, Espen (1997, 18). 
250 Murray, Janet H. (1997, 129). 
251 See Barthes, Roland (1982, 142-8). 
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Despite the design behind it, however, the game space is primarily a subjective 
construction, rendering the game world itself into a partly distinct but more explicitly 
spatial phenomenon. Ludic experience transforms an actual space into a virtual whole, 
which is kept together by various factors including immersion and agency. The space 
itself is governed by the rules, which also steer the ludic motivation towards certain 
endogenous goals. 
 
Events in the game space must be distinguished from the game states through which the 
interpretations are made by the player-subjects. Events represent the occurrences in game 
space that a non-player-subject, in other words a member of the possible audience, is able 
to access. From the point of perception of the player-subject herself, understanding the 
game space as a sequence of states enables us to see any gaming experience being based 
more profoundly on its spatial dimension as opposed to the temporal one. 
 
The state sequence is constantly narrativized by the player-subject during gaming. Every 
state is interpreted in relation to the states past and the states to come; the gaming 
experience is necessarily contextualised by the game space. As we have come to note 
during the text, narrative has a twofold relationship with games. Every game imaginable 
is narrativized by the player-subject, while those with a narrative space of their own form 
a simulated narrative, in which the agency of the player-subject is a factor in the creation 
of the narrative. In other words, the game and its simulated narrative are both spatial 
phenomena whose meanings are connected by the player-subject’s motivation to act 
according to the rules and goals of a particular space. 
 
In regard to the juxtaposition between ludology and narratology taken up in the 
introduction, the thesis presents a mediating resolution. The basic premise of ludology is 
undoubtedly a correct one, since the gaming experience itself is the most essential aspect 
of gaming. However, games include many elements within the realm of narratology, 
some of which are fundamental to the act of gaming. The approach adopted by the this 
text gives an opportunity to examine narrative constructions in ludic contexts without 
losing sight of what is the most important thing in game studies. Ludology takes 
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precedence, but it cannot really exist in all its forms without narratology. In addition to 
examining all the new aspects games has brought to the field of cultural studies, it is also 
of importance to see gaming as a continuation of developments in the field concerned.252 
That means continuing to take advantage of both the ludic and the narrative traditions. 
 
We can also assert that at this point in time, the history of electronic gaming having only 
spanned about half a century, it is quite understandable that in games, we are still 
‘fighting the bad guys’ instead of ‘fighting the bad guys to save someone’. In other words, 
the processes of signification and narrativization in the ludic context are perhaps not yet 
given enough attention. Maybe it is not even a question of whether gamers or game 
scholars would ‘get it’, but whether the designers can integrate to games satisfactory 
elements which draw from other sources than glittering graphics or booming sound 
effects. Although the basic building materials of electronic games have remained the 
same for decades,253 the explicit narrative dimension can still be considered one of the 
most important points of evolvement. 
 
As always, there is much room for further studies. The different roles narratives play in 
ludic spaces are in need of additional scrutinising. For instance, it would be very useful to 
analyse further the way the narrativization relates to the simulated narrative and to the 
endogenous substance, in order to better outline the different kinds of narrative 
construction possible for ludic spaces. Also the way individual interpretations of the same 
game spaces relate to each other has been practically left out of the discussion in question. 
 
The aim of this thesis was to show how the act of gaming is really a point of view, a 
perspective. It transforms what is to what can be, giving birth to something virtual in the 
process. The space created is characterised by a certain sense of formality inherent only 
to that particular environment. The rest is reality. 
 
 
                                                 
252 Sihvonen, Tanja (2004, 48). 
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